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MICHAEL H. DAVIS

The Law/Politics Distinction, the French Conseil
Constitutionnel, and the U.S. Supreme Court
A dispute burns across the landscape of French constitutional
law regarding the juridical nature of the French constitutional
"Supreme Court", the Conseil constitutionnel: is it a court? Both
French and American scholars have claimed that, despite superficial
similarities between the U.S. Supreme Court and the French Conseil
constitutionnel,*the American system of judicial review "can have
no counterpart in the French system", 2 that French legal and political theory is inconsistent with an effective supreme court, that
there is "no possibility" that the French and American systems
difference", 3 and that the Conseil is simcould surmount this "major
4
court".
"true
a
ply not
The scholars furnish six fundamental reasons.5 First, its membership is political and unprotected by life tenure. Second, its subject matter is substantially limited to proposed rather than existing
legislation and, further, the scope of such review is limited to deciding only whether the legislature has intruded upon the executive,
not reaching the substantive constitutional issues with which Americans are familiar. Third, matters brought before the Conseil are not
contradicted; while there may be a controversy, its resolution never
MICHAEL H. DAVIS is Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio. The author is indebted to the following people for their help, encouragement, patience, and generosity, for their examples that it is possible to bridge two cultures to the profit of both, and for the
lesson therein that world peace can be both real and ideal: Prof. Arthur T. von
Mehren, Prof. Andre Tunc, Prof. Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, and Prof. Louis Favoreu.
The author also thanks his research assistant, John Oreh, and Prof. Favoreu's research assistant, Patrick Gala, for their time and professionalism.
1. I will refer to the Conseil contitutionnelthroughout this article as the Conseil, except when directly translating from French text into English. In those instances, I use the literal English equivalent, "Constitutional Council", or, where the
French text so dictates, simply "Council". When referring to other French organs
which may have confusingly similar labels, however, especially the Conseil d'Etat, I
use the full title to distinguish them, unless, again, it appears within a translation
from the French text in which case, if the context does not indicate to which organ
the text refers, a bracketed addition completes the identification.
2. Tallon, "The Constitution and the Courts in France," 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 567,
575 (1979).
3. Id. at 575. See also text, infra at 58-60.
4. Von Mehren & Gordley, The Civil Law System 121 (2nd ed., 1977).
5. See text, infra at 58-65 for detailed description of the Conseil.
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entails a "case" involving individual litigating parties. Fourth, its
procedures are secretive, non-public, arguably nonjudicial, and do
not offer any formal access-for individuals, groups, or the publicto the questions it considers. Fifth, its jurisdiction is ambiguous,
sharing ultimate power with two other independent jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the finality of its decisions is more theoretical than
real. Sixth and finally, its institutional design seems nonjudicial, its
textual constitutional source arising from a section separate from
the judiciary, its historical roots being allied more with the legislature and executive than with the judiciary.
THE FRENCH ANTIPATHY To JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

French courts seem impotent when measured by American
standards, because the French have been reluctant to establish a
strong judicial hierarchy. In this context, the term "judicial hierarchy" includes three concepts: a bureaucratic hierarchy, being a pyramidal structure within which inferior courts follow the direction
of superior jurisdictions; a chronological hierarchy, establishing
precedents to which later cases must conform; and a jurisprudential
hierarchy, of a supra-legislative constitutional norm with which legislative action must comply. Because of the French antipathy to judicial hierarchies, certain American legal doctrines seem
incompatible with the French legal system.
For instance, the scope of precedent is highly attenuated. Judicial decisions are not to apply to later disputes. Furthermore, a case
may be appealed and reversed, and yet the subsequent trial court
may ignore the decision of the appellate court.6 Thus, not only is
the precedential value of earlier decisions de-emphasized but there
is no certain "law of the case".
Also, at least until very recently, virtually no judicial review,
constitutional or otherwise, of legislation could exist in French jurisprudence. What French control of constitutionality there has been
has not been judicial. This does not mean that the French deny the
importance of constitutional values. They have rather denied that
the constitution gives courts a legal basis for overruling legitimately
promulgated legislation. To an American, the notion that the organs
of government would, by themselves, respect constitutional rules
may seem naive.
The French antipathy to judicial hierarchy is obviously, if
crudely, traceable to the French Revolution as a reaction against
egregious tyranny under the earlier monarchy and its associated (literal) courts, or Parlements. To combat judicial hierarchy, the
6. See text, infra at 50-51.
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French have periodically resorted to different arrangements aimed
at subordinating their courts to the legislature. And because of this
tradition, attempts to create a Supreme Court-either in the sense
of imposing bureaucratic hierarchy through final court of review,
chronological hierarchy through stare decisis, or jurisprudential hierarchy through a constitutional court designed to impose constitutional values-have been half-hearted. Even the present state of the
French judiciary reveals an ambiguity. Whereas most French scholars still 7 recognize both a legislative "power" and an executive
"power", the Constitution of 1958 mentions only a judicial "authority"-in contrast to the Constitution of 1946 which, following a constitutional tradition since the Constitution of 1791, referred to a
judicial "power". 8 The President is, paternally, the "guarantor of
the independence" of the judiciary. 9
The French rejection of judicial review and binding precedent is
unassailable if one starts, as the French have since 1789, with a
boundless devotion to pure democracy. Since the Revolution, the
development of a special view of democracy' has propelled French
politics, particularly as defined in opposition to the Ancien Regime's
tyranny. This view of democracy finds its inspiration in the notion
of a constituent population from which all legitimate authority
comes. Since the source of political legitimacy in French law is located directly in the people and, thus, the legislature, any attempt to
defeat that smacks not only of tyranny but also of unconstitutionality. A constitution founded upon popular supremacy tends therefore
to define judicial review, which opposes the popular will, as itself illegitimate and unconstitutional.
Not only does the French experience tend to equate judicial review or even a strong judiciary with antimajoritarianism and ultimately with antidemocratic principles, it also raises questions about
7. But see Hauriou & Gicquel, DrOit Constitutionnelet InstitutionsPolitiques
1031 (1981): "Within the context of the institutions established in 1958 it is preferable, it seems, to drop the term legislativepower.... "
8. Title VII, Const. of 1958; see Perrot, InstitutionsJudiciaires48-49 (1983).

9. These words are not a matter of chance: they derive from the notion
that the judicial function is a product of the indivisible power of the State
for which the President of the Republic has responsibility. They are the negation of the principle that would tend to consider the judiciary as a third
power....
Perrot, id. at 48-49.
10. There are several possible definitions of democracy; in fact, perhaps the predominant concern of American jurisprudes today is to define democracy such that it
includes anti-majoritarian elements, especially judicial review. The different defini-

tions are suggested by Choper, JudicialReview and the National PoliticalProcess
(1980); Ely, Democracy and Distmst (1980); Perry, The Constitution,The Courts, and
Human Rights (1983); Symposium, "Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text
and Beyond," 8 U. Dayton L Rev. 443 (1983); and, of course, Hamilton, Jefferson, &
Jay, The FederalistPapers.
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liberalism and its intellectual lackey, the separation of powers doctrine. The French conception of separation of powers differs radically from the American."
It is functional and essentialistic,
claiming that each of the three branches of government has a clear
and separately definable domain of conduct into which the other
two branches should not enter. Perhaps the most concise description of the "functional" doctrine is that of a "mutual independence
of the principal organs", 12 as opposed to the American system of
checks and balances. This doctrine is far more "rigid", (rigide) perhaps absolutely so, than its more "flexible" (souple) American
3
counterpart.1
The conflict between liberalism and pure democracy is highlighted by the French experience. Judicial review is a feature of liberalism but not necessarily of democracy. Liberalism which posits
conflict between individuals and groups demands an impartial arbiter of disputes. It requires a legal system which can resolve conflicts
and an autonomous body of law to which judges can impersonally
refer. This characterization of the judiciary allows liberalism to
deny its antidemocratic bias by suggesting that judicial review's restraint on the majority derives not from the minority's desires but
from an immanent body of legal principles which dictate the results
and which thereby protects majority as well as minority.
The apparent impotence of the French judiciary, by its rejection
of both precedent and judicial review, is deceptive if seen as an impotence of law itself. It is simply an attempt to limit, but not destroy, the scope of the legal system, to prevent its intrusion into
what the French, at least, see as non-legal, political domains. While
this may seem absurd to the American legal scholar, it makes sense
in a system which fears a threat of legal dictatorship, a "Govern14
ment by Judges".
Two examples, one an abortive attempt to impose a hierarchy
upon the ordinary courts, the other an almost stillborn attempt to
create a constitutional court, illustrate the antipathy to judicial hierarchy and the current controversy over the Conseil constitutionnel.
Both attempts vividly demonstrate the French ambiguity over a
strong judiciary.
11. See text, infra at 89-91.
12. Troper, preface to Moulin, Le Presidentialismeet la classification des regimes politiques x (L.G.D.J. 1978) (emphasis supplied).
13. Rouban, "L'Inconstitutionnalite du Veto Legislative aux Etats-Unis," 1984
R.D.P. 956-67; see also Troper, infra n. 17.
14. Lambert, Le Gouvernement des Judge et La Lutte Contre La Legislation
Sociale Aux Etats-Unis (1921). Typically, the phrase continues to be used as a mildly
negative characterization of the real or potential role of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Rouban, id. at 949, 968. Vincent, Conseil d'Etat, 22 March, 1945, S.1945 Part III, 53,
53-54 (note Charlier).
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Attempts at Bureaucraticand 0hronologicalHierarchy
Preferring a judicial system which would not make law, but
only apply it, one in which a court's interpretation would not bind
all later cases, the French Revolutionary Assemblies designed a
number of unusual solutions. Already recognized in France was a
"right" to a second trial, the "double degri de jurisdiction". The
threat of bureaucratic hierarchy posed by the existence of a second,
potentially "reviewing", court was at first avoided through the
mechanism of the circular appeal (appel circulaire)in which courts
of equal status, but different venue, would review each other's
decisions.
But this raised other obvious problems' 5 and so, after a few
short years, another level, the tribunauxd'appel were created to receive appeals from the trial courts of first instance. Atop this structure sat the Tribunal de Cassation. The potential hierarchy posed
by this situation, however, was neutralized by two pre-existing legislative provisions.
The first solution was an "optional legislative reference" which,
by requiring that in novel cases the court seek a legislative interpretation, assured that tribunals would not "make law".' 6 This "optional" legislative reference has not survived, 17 but the prohibition
against regulations or, "arrets de reglements", abusive legislation
through quasi-judicial proceedings, was soon codified' in 1804 and
persists to this day as Article 5 of the Civil Code. 19
The second solution was a mandatory legislative reference imposed upon the Tribunal de cassation. The new Tribunal de cassation was prohibited from ordering a particular result in a case or
even ordering a particular legal interpretation and could only remand to a different intermediate court for a new trial. After two remands, the Tribunal was required to refer the matter to the
legislature, for a binding legal interpretation. 20 That solved the
question of uniformity and finality but merely heightened the constitutional confusion, leaving the French legal system substantially
in the position in which it started. To bind a judicial organ through
a legislative reference left the nature of the resulting process in
grave doubt. Although it avoided the forbidden arre*t de reglement,
15. See Hilaire, Histoiredu Droitet des Institutions323-324 (1975).
16. "They shall not make regulations, but they shall go to the legislative body
each time they believe it necessary, whether to interpret a law or to make a new
one." Art. 12, Law of 16 and 24 August 1790.
17. See Troper, La separationdes pouvoirs et l'histaireconstitutionellefrangaise
62 (1980). See also Hilaire, supra n. 15 at 304, 323-324.
18. Hilaire, id. at 315.
19. "Judges are prohibited from deciding by way of general dispositions and regulations in the cases submitted to them." Art. 5, Civil Code.
20. Art. 21, ch. 5, title III of the Constitution of 1791.
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it seemed to deprive parties of a judicial forum by carrying the Montesquieu formula of separation of powers to its illogical extreme. 21
In fact, the procedure injected the legislature into judicial matters; to remove all possibility of doubt, the Constitution expressly
stated that the Tribunal was "established alongside the legislature".22 This arrangement was criticized and altered through at
least half a dozen legislative and constitutional changes, following
almost as many changes of government, but the legitimacy of the basic procedure was not formally questioned until 1823, in a decision
by the Council of State.23 Ultimately in 1837 legislative reference
was abolished in favor of a final judicial decision, to be rendered en
banc by the Cour de cassation, the successor to the Tribunal. 24
The antipathy towards hierarchy left the judiciary in a rather
ambiguous state which remains today. The Cour de cassation still
cannot directly order a lower court to comply with its wishes. When
sitting in full session (Assemblde plenire), it can demand compliance only after two renvois and even then only with respect to the
exact question already twice decided. The lower court of renvoi can
still base its decision on a different point of law or set of facts. 25 A
1967 amendment allowed the Cour effectively to issue its own decision in those circumstances. But for the first ten years of its existence the provision went unused. A recent more general form of that
provision was enacted in 197926 but it appears that it has hardly, if
27
ever, been used.
Thus a direct effect of revolutionary passions and desires, the
21. See Geny, Methode d'nterpretationet Sources en DroitPrivd Positif 327, 446
(2d ed., trans. La. State Law Inst. 1954). See also text, supra at 47-48. On the other
hand, our American system of judicial review, according to one influential French
commentator, has "carried the constitutional dogma of Montesquieu to its ultimate
logical consequence." Lambert, supra n. 14 at 15.
22. Constitution of 3 September 1791, Title III, ch. V, art. 19. This was not a
merely fortuitous choice of words. It formalizes the decision of the framers of the
1791 Constitution to establish a body which would "sit close by the legislature," and
thereby achieve uniformity of judicial action without doing violence to legislative intent and supremacy. Lesage, Les interventions du Legislateur dans le Fonctionnement de la Justice 184 (1960), cited in von Mehren & Gordley, supra n. 4 at 220.
23. Opinion of 17-26 December 1823, Conseil d'Etat, Assemblee generale, 17-26
December 1823, 24 Duvergier, Collection complete des Lois, Decrete, Ordonnances,

Reglements, et Avis du Conseil d'Etat 390 (1828). For a helpful English translation,
see von Mehren & Gordley, supra n. 4 at 226.
24. Law of 1 April 1837. The French, however, were still troubled that this finality would interfere with the principle of legislative sovereignty. Geny, in his defense of increased judicial powers, responded in a way curiously anticipatory of the

present controversy over the Conseil's nature; Geny, supra n. 21 at 328.
25. An illustration of the potential independence of intermediate courts is
"i'affaire Franck". Cass. ch. reun. 2 dec. 1941, D.C. 1942.25, note G. Ripert, S.
1941.1.217, note H. Mazeaud.
26. C.o.j.: L.131-5 al. 2, Law of 3 January 1979.
27. Roland & Boyer, Les InstitutionsJudiciaires225 (2d ed. 1983).

HeinOnline -- 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 50 1986

1986]

DAVIS: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

antipathy towards both bureaucratic and chronological hierarchy
persists even today in modern France. Contemporary texts insist
that French judges simply decide disputes and that their decisions
can have no precedential effect.2s It is not so simple in practice.
Though Article V of the Civil Code forbids courts from issuing such
arrts, it has been observed that the Cour de cassation, simply
through its bureaucratic influence, has successfully voided that
prohibition.- 9
A FailedAttempt at JurisprudentialHierarchy
This same ambiguous development is illustrated in the Comitd
constitutionnel, the immediate predecessor to the Conseil. The end
of World War II also brought an end to the Third Republic and the
questionable constitutionality of the government of its immediate
successor or final leader, Marshal P6tain. The contradictions of the
P6tain government, and the frightening abuses of law, both constitutional and otherwise, of the Nazi era in Germany lent urgency to
those who supported greater control of constitutionality or meaningful restraint on potential abuses, in France.
While the Petain government offended the moral sensibilities of
many, its legal sin, at least to the legal technician, was its abuse of
delegated powers. 30 Accordingly, the Comiti was only empowered
to decide whether legislation entailed amendment of the constitution. Excluded from the grounds for such a decision was that part of
the Constitution, the Preamble, which addressed substantive individual rights; left were only those provisions establishing the structure
of the three governmental branches.
The Comit6 could only review a law before its promulgation,
could only be seized by a joint request of the President of the Republic and the President of the Council of the Republic, and only
upon an absolute majority vote of the Council. The sole legal issue
the ComitL4 was to decide was whether a proposed law "implies a revision of the Constitution".3 ' A finding of unconstitutionality only
resulted in submitting the Constitution to an essentially legislative
amendment process. 32 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
Comitd's primary duty, before deciding the legal issue, was to recon28. See Hilaire, supra n.15 at 315.
29. Lambert, supra n.15 at 2, n. 1 (1921).
30. For a concise, more or less legal, history of the Petain regime, or at least the
French view of it, see Guchet, Elements de Droit Constitutionnel 116-117, 231-236
(1981); Hauriou & Gicquel, supra n. 7 at 841-844.
31. Constitution of 27 October 1946, Art. 91, para. 3; Art. 93 para. 1, Gaz PaL,
1946 L. 406.
32. Constitution of 27 October 1946, Art. 93, para. 2; Art. 90, Gaz PaL, 1946 L.
406.
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cile the two legislative chambers, "to strive to bring about agreement" between the chambers.3 3 Thus, there is some reason to view
the Comitd as merely a quasi-legislative feature of the new Regime
d'Assemblde introduced by the Fourth Republic, rather than as a
Supreme Court in any primitive sense.u One might say that it "sat
by the legislature".3
THE CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL
Substance
The Conseil Constitutionnel,heir to the traditional French distrust of the judiciary, exhibits its pedigree in two ways. First, its
dual function of review and advice shows a mixed lineage of legislative and judicial forebears. Second, its powers of review are constrained within limits reflecting a narrow vision of legitimate
judicial activity. Its membership is claimed to be excessively political. It cannot review actual cases nor can any but a very few official
bodies seek its review. Its power to declare legislative materials
flatly unconstitutional can be exercised only before laws are fully
enacted. Its review of already existing legislation is limited to stating whether Parliament has intruded upon the executive domain. It
is an exaggeration to call the resulting decision a mere request or
suggestion, as with the Comit, but it certainly has an advisory, almost legislative, flavor.
The Constitution addresses the Conseil under a sectionm separate from the section in which it purports to address exclusively the
judiciary.3 7 This is an important point because it textually supports
the argument that the Conseil was not meant to have any control
over the judicial hierarchy, despite the language of Article 62 which
seems to give its decisions finality. In fact, there are two other jurisdictions, each one of which might be considered to be a part of a different juridical order and none having final authority over the other
two. The regular courts, under the Cour de cassation, regularly recognize they have no powers to invalidate legislation.38 Similarly,
while the Council of State controls constitutionality of administrative action, it expressly disclaims any power to invalidate legislation,
33. Constitution of 27 October 1946, Art. 92, para. 2, Gaz PaL, 1946 L. 406.
34. Guchet, supra n. 30 at 117.
35. See supra n. 22; Sueur, Le Regime d'Assembl6e et l'elaboration de la constitution de la We Republique RPD 1209.

36. Const. of 1958, Tit. VII, Arts. 56-63.
37. Const. of 1958, Tit. VIII, Arts. 64-66.
38. Schtavon v. Ministere public, Cour de Cassation, Ch. crim., 26 February 1974,
D. & S. 1974. J. 273. For a helpful English translation, see von Mehren & Gordley,
supra n. 4 at 323, 450.
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in other words, traditional judicial review.3 9 The possibility of conflict between these organs has occasionally become the reality.4°
There are nine members of the Conseil, three appointed by the
President of the Republic, three by the President of the Senate, and
three by the National Assembly. Their terms are nonrenewable.
The President of the Republic may name one of the members of the
Conseil President who can then break a tie vote.41 In addition to the
nominated members, all former Presidents of the Republic have a
seat as of right.
Members of the Conseil cannot also be members of Parliament,
of the Government, or of the Economic and Social Council. 42 During
his term, a member can neither be named to public employment
a civil servant, receive a merit promotion (promotion
nor, if already
43
au choix).
To guarantee the "independence and dignity" of the Conseil,
certain obligations are imposed upon the membership. Members are
forbidden from taking "any public positions" respecting "questions
which are or which might become the object of decisions by the Conseil."44 But there are no prerequisites, such as legal training, for
membership. Thus, although a bare handful of jurists have occasionits membership has
ally been named to the Conseil, historically
45
been composed primarily of political figures.
The Conseil has other duties of advice, administration, and ex39. Arrighi, Council of State, 6 November 1936, D. 1938. III. 1, S.1937. III. 33; for
a helpful though partial English translation, see von Mehren & Gordley, id. at 256.
Syndicat general des fabricants de semoules de France, Council of State, 1 March
1968, 1968 A.J.D.A. 235.
40. The Conseil has split with the Council of State on at least three and perhaps
four occasions. The most notorious of these concerned the power of the Executive to
regulate and punish minor violations with terms of imprisonment. Another was decision 69-55 L. Rec. 27, 26 June 1969, in which the Conseil held that, as a general
principle of law, administrative silence constitutes rejection; the Council of State,
however, has not accepted this principle. Cne. de Bozas, C.E. ass. 27 February 1970,
A.J. 1970.232. In a third situation, the Conseil has held that laws in derogation of
valid international treaties, whether enacted before or after such treaties, should be
treated by other jurisdictions as invalid. Decision 74-54 DC (Rec. 19), 15 January
1975. The Council of State has consistently rejected that. Rekhou, 29 May 1981;
UDT, 22 October 1979; Croissant,d.E., Ass., 7 July 1978. The Cour de cassation, however, has followed the Conseil's lead. Societe Jacques Vabre, ch. mixte, 24 May 1975.
Finally, in a fourth situation, the Conseil has held that the principle of "participation" is part of the positive law. Decisions of 5 July 1977, 20 July 1977, 18 January
1978. The Council of State seems to have rejected this. 15 December 1978, D.
1979.327.
41. Const. of 1958, Art. 56.
42. Const. of 1958, Art. 57; Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958, Art. 4.
43. Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958, Art. 5.
44. Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958, Art. 7.
45. Hauriou & Gicquel, supra n. 7 at 1131 n. 5 (1981); id., Addendum au 30 juillet
1982, at 64 (1982 supp.).
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amination, such as supervision of elections and referenda,4 review
of parliamentary procedures, 47 supervision of impeachment proceedings,4 8 and advice upon declarations of national emergency. 49 Only
its powers to examine or review legislation are further considered
here.
The Conseil can review two types of legislative materials in two
very different modes. It may review proposed legislation for constitutional violations of any kind, although probably not for violations
of the separation of powers doctrine;O or, it may review existing legislation but only for a violation of that particular doctrine. 5 1 Its review of proposed legislation is shared with Parliament, although a
legislature is not traditionally thought to be, at least by Americans, a
body exercising such a control of constitutionality.
This review of proposed legislation has two constitutional
sources. First, under Article 41, the President or a parliamentary
chamber may request that the Conseil review proposed legislation to
ascertain whether it suffers the particular constitutional defect of invading the executive domain.52 The Conseil must answer within a
week. In a manner reminiscent of the Comite constitutionnel, however, the Government and the Parliament are encouraged to work
things out, since review before the Conseil is triggered only "upon
disagreement between the Government and the President of the interested chamber. 5 3s The more important source is Article 61,
which provides that the Conseil may examine proposed laws for any
constitutional defect, inquiring into "their conformity with the Constitution," upon request of the President of the Republic, the Prime
Minister, the President of either parliamentary chamber, or 60 of
their members.54
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Const. of 1958, Arts. 58-60.
Const. of 1958, Art. 61, Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958, Art. 17.
Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958, Art. 13.
Const. of 1958, Art. 16.
Decision 82-143 DC du 30 juillet limited Art. 61 review to disputes not involv-

ing allegedly improper legislative intrusions into the executive, regulatory, domain.
51. Both French and American scholars sometimes recognize only the first of
these modes as judicial review, reserving for the second some other, more eclectic,

term. For instance, French students are taught, in at least one text, that the first
process is "Control of conformity of certain acts with the Constitution," while the
second is merely "Miscellaneous Duties". Auby & Ducos-Ader, DroitPublic 120-121
(6th ed. 1976). See von Mehren & Gordley, supra n. 4 at 97. I include them both
under review of legislative materials because, as will become clearer, functionally
these processes do not radically differ from each other and comparatively the second
is not dissimilar from Supreme Court practices which even the French recognize as
constitutional control.

52. Art. 41 also provides for review of proposed legislation which arguably conflicts with powers previously delegated to the executive. That procedure, however,

does not directly address nor affect the substance of this article.
53. Const. of 1958, Art. 41.
54. Const. of 1958, Art. 61; as revised by Constitutional Law No. 74-904 of 29 Oc-
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The Conseil's review of existing legislation is governed by the
second paragraph of Article 37. The Prime Minister is authorized to
initiate a proceeding, called "delegalization", to determine whether
an existing law impermissibly regulates an area which the Constitution has exclusively assigned to the executive branch.as This review
is especially important because of the structure of the present
French government under the 1958 Constitution. Under Article 34,
Parliament has only specifically enumerated and limited powers,
with all non-enumerated powers going to the executive under the
first, substantive, paragraph of Article 37, which declares that all
powers not specifically assigned to the legislature6 belong to the executive. Thus, "delegalization", a finding that legislation has inof a
truded into the executive domain, is similar, though perhaps
57
lesser order of magnitude, to a finding of unconstitutionality.
The Constitution purports to grant res judicata effect to decisions of the Consel.58 The exact meaning of this grant and especially its impact and scope-what constitutes the Conseil's decision
and what is surplus-has been debated. It is even more debatable
for two major reasons. First, the effect of "delegalization" under
Article 37 is not quite the same as a finding of unconstitutionality.
A "law" found to enter the executive domain is not thereby nullified. It is simply of "a regulatory character",5 9 to be altered by executive action. 6° Until so altered, however, its force as regulation
remains. Secondly, two other jurisdictions can interpret, if not review, legislation: the ordinary and administrative courts. Since the
Conseil does not "oversee" or review these jurisdictions, it is possible
that despite Article 62, differences can occur with no assurance of
of this
final resolution. A dubious argument can be made in support
6'
Constitution.
the
to
reference
textual
through
uncertainty
In none of the above-described instances is the determination of
constitutionality related to a case involving litigating parties. In
fact, there is no case in the common understanding of the term.
tober 1974. The 1974 revision added the 60 members of Parliament to the other four
officials who previously had the sole power to initiate review.

55. Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958, Arts. 24-26.
56. Almost all legislative areas are specifically enumerated, in relative detail, in
Art. 34.
57. See infra n. 247.
58. Const. of 1958, Art. 62 states:
A measure declared unconstitutional can neither be promulgated nor
have any effect.
Decisions of the Constitutional Council are not subject to any further
review. They are binding upon the public powers and upon all administrative and judicial authorities.
59. Const. of 1958, Art. 37 para. 2.
60. The term "regulatory" is a term of art denoting the executive domain. Its
counterpart is "law" which denotes the Parliamentary, legislative, domain.
61. See supra n. 7-9 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, initiation of all the procedures is only available upon petition of a few rigidly defined official bodies or groups, and only prior
to the application of a law. Limited constitutional review of existing
law-for impermissible legislative intrusion into the executive domain-can be requested only by legislative officials or the
government.
Procedure
Unlike traditional judicial bodies, the Conseil's proceedingsnot just its deliberations--are entirely non-public. No lawyers are
present to advocate a particular position;62 there are no oral
presentations. All information presented to the court, what there is
of it, is written, and none of that information is necessarily ever
63
disclosed.
Typically, a statement of position outlining the petitioner's argument and occasionally limiting the object of the petition is submitted. Early practice was to submit it sometime after the letter of
petition, but current practice seems to be to combine the two documents. 64 There have been occasional attempts to submit, with or in
addition to the letter of petition, a true brief, or memoire ampliatif,
analogous to that submitted in administrative practice. In addition,
on at least one occasion, a right to reply was sought but apparently
rebuffed. 65 However, the Conseil itself has the opportunity to
gather information, assisted by staff members of the Council of
State and Cour des comptes assigned to the Conseil. This includes
documents as well as testimony by, or more accurately interviews
66
with, government officials.
A decision is rendered in the typical French single sentence judicial style, the phrase unique. Its format is in the French syllogistic
judicial style, with a series of "whereas" phrases leading up to a final
"therefore" conclusion. This similarity to normal judicial decisions,
and the fact that they are explained (motivie) is partly due to the
requirements of an organic law6 7 as well as to more idiosyncratic
62. This, however, is essentially the same procedure as before two other French
courts of recognized juridicality, the Tribunaldes conflits and the Cour des comptes.
The only time there was an attempt to retain a lawyer, which was made by some
legislators contesting a law altering the status of state workers, it was apparently unsuccessful. Lebreton, "Les Particularites de la Jurisdiction Constitutionnelle," 1983
R.D.P. 419, 441. Favoreu & Philip, Le Conseil Constitutionnel 25, P.U.F., Que SaisJe?, no. 1724 (2d ed. 1980).
63. Favoreu & Philip, id. at 25-26.
64. Lebreton, supra n. 62 at 419, 426.
65. Id. at 419, 441.
66. Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 62 at 25-32; see also, Hauriou & Gicquel, supra n.
7 at 1053.
67. Lebreton, supra n. 62 at 419, 428.
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reasons. 8
There is no dissent, no mention of which members participated,
no vote tally, nor the name of any author.69 Some of these details,
however, can be gleaned from the popular press, and such reports
appear, in fact, to be the accepted--or expected-source for this information.7 0 In the twenty-five years of its existence, the Conseil
has developed a rich practice according to which it occasionally refuses to decide all that is apparently before it, equally occasionally
seems to decide more than was originally presented, or, alternatively, couches its decisions within certain hypothetical limitations
(reserves) which it assumes in its decisions. Often, these limitations
are assumptions about the scope of a challenged law,
assumptions
71
which, if binding, become restrictive interpretations.
THE ISSUES

Is the Conseil a "court"? Two widely-respected French authors
seem quite positive:
This issue is hardly anymore even the object of discussion today. It is recognized that the Conseil acts as a judicial body (jurisdiction), not only in electoral matters, but
equally in the other cases with the exception of those, very
72
rare, where it is must issue an advisory opinion.
But two American scholars question the Conseil's nature; von
Mehren and Gordley claim that, " [s]tanding apart both institutionally and functionally from the regular- and administrative-court hierarchies is the Conseil Constitutionnel.'7 3 Despite the fact that the
Conseil Constitutionnel sometimes declares proposed statutes unconstitutional and has "delegalized" numerous laws for having overstepped constitutional bounds, French scholar Denis Tallon seems to
agree that the Conseil is not a court, stating, "in France, there is no
control of the constitutionality of legislation by the courts.1 74 Similarly, Cappelletti and Cohen declare: "The Conseil Constitutionnel
68. Ordinance No. 58-1067 of 7 November 1958, Arts. 20, 26.
69. However, recently, and for the first time, in connection with the decision of
16 January 1982 relative to the nationalization laws, the reporter's identity became
known, when a supplementary statement of position attached to the letter of petition was addressed personally to him. Hauriou & Gicquel, supra n. 7 at Addendum

au 30 juillet 1982, 63 (1982 supp.).
70. See Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 62 at 25; see also, Balat, La Nature Juridique

du Controle de Constitutionnalitedes Lois dans Le Cadre de lArticle 61 de La Constitution de 1958, 39 n. 22 (1983), and accompanying text, which takes issue with
others who claim that such press reports can actually function, in a jurisprudential
fashion, as a substitute for the lack of party litigation before the Conseil.
71. Lebreton, supra n. 62 at 419, 472-483.
72. Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 62 at 5.
73. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra n. 4 at 97.
74. Tallon, supra n. 3 at 567.
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is not a judicial body. It is a political institution .... -75
However, the vitality of the issue may relate more to political
circumstances than to settled jurisprudential ideas. Its resolution
may depend upon what the Conseil--as a highly political issue if not
a political institution-does.76 The recent controversial decision invalidating part of the nationalization laws revitalized the issue, at
least temporarily. After that decision, the Socialists coined a new
word, normocratie,to describe what they regarded as the Conseil's
illegitimate substitution and use of supra-legislative norms for, and
in place of, legislative rules: "We represent the people", said Pierre
Joxe, leader of the Socialist coalition, "They represent the political
'77
majority of an earlier time.
In the debate over the nature of the Conseil nature, there are
two somewhat different strands in the thread of the argument. One
seems to discuss the Conseil solely in the restrictive light of French
tradition. The other approaches the subject from a broad jurisprudential perspective including the expansive American tradition and,
within it, the U.S. Supreme Court as one example of a juridical
body. Since the Conseil obviously determines the constitutionality
of legislation, the first strand can easily reach a pat conclusion of
non-juridicality on the grounds that French courts simply do not do
that.
Whatever motivates the dispute, it seems to resolve into the six
categories previously mentioned 8 : membership, subject-matter,
non-contradictiousness, procedure, jurisdiction, and institutional design. 79 Tallon's position is representative, addressing all six issues:
The Conseil constitutionnel is an innovation.... Its main
function is to supervise the conformity of acts of Parliament, as to their constitutionality. But it does not perform
this function as a judicial body ....In the Constitution, it is
described in a separate title ... not under the heading of
the judiciary.... Its nine members do not have the status
of judges. They are nominated in equal numbers by the
President of the Republic and the Presidents of the two
Houses. Moreover, ex-Presidents of the Republic are ex-officio members.... [A]n action may be brought only by a
limited number of persons.... [N]o one else, and no indi75. Cappelletti & Cohen, Comparative ConstitutionalLaw 29 (1979).
76. Favoreu, "Le Conseil Constitutionnel et l'Alternance," Rev. FrangaiseScience PoL 102-128 (aout-octobre 1984).
77. Hauriou & Gicquel, supra n. 7 at Addendum au 30 Juillet 1982, 63 (1982
supp.).

78. See supra n.5 and accompanying text.
79. A fairly comprehensive discussion is contained in Luchaire, "Le Conseil Constitutionnel Est-f1 Une Jurisdiction?," 1979 Rev. Dr.Pub. 27.
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vidual, has access.... Those who have must act immediately... before promulgation.... Finally, this control is
reserved to acts of Parliament. Executive and administra
tive regulations are outside.., the Conseil's controlY°
Similarly, Brown states, with respect to membership, subject-matter,
and non-contradictiousness:
Certainly, the Council's functioning is far removed from
American notions of judicial review. It does not have the
guarantees of impartiality and independence associated with
a true court. It acts only before a law has gone into effect,
and is in no way open to the individual citizen who may be
harmed by the law."'
He concludes, unsurprisingly, "The Council is not really a constitu'
tional court at all."82
Addressing only membership and institutional
design, von Mehren and Gordley state:
...

the Council is not considered to be a court in the full

sense of that term. This view is based in part on the Council's composition-one-third of its nine members are appointed every three years for nine-year terms by the
President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly, and the President of the Senate--and in part on the
conception that the drafters of the Constitution had of the
Council. The question remains whether the Council may,
in time, evolve into a true court, exercising judicial review
over legislation. By 1976, certain events suggest that such
an evolution may be under way. However, development in
this direction faces great institutional and political
obstacles.83
The definition of a "true court" is the heart of the dispute. It
raises the more fundamental definition of law and its autonomy
from politics. Implicit in all the arguments raised against the Conseil'sjudicial nature is that there exists a radical dichotomy between
law and politics and between "true" courts and political bodies. It
seems significant, therefore, that Cappelletti and Cohen deny the judicial nature of the Conseil but fail to define a court, instead simply
asking, "What are the characteristics of a 'judicial' rather than 'political', organ of government"?" To be fair, the authors add that
"since 1971, the Council has begun to develop into an effective, in80. Tallon, supra n. 3 at 567, 569 (1979).
81. Brown, "DeGaulle's Republic and the Rule of Law: Judicial Review -andthe
Conseil d'Etat," 1966 Boston U.L. Rev. 462, 469 (emphasis supplied).
82. Brown, id. at 462, 469.
83. Von Mehren & Gordley, supra n. 4 at 121.
84. Cappelletti & Cohen, supra n. 75 at 72.
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dependent organ" a (although still not ascribing to it a judicial nature), and hedge their bets by adding, "it was not originally
intended to be a judicial organ of review."' 6
The critics can be confident that their views were shared as well
by the drafters of the 1958 French Constitution. Right or wrong in
their views about the nature of law and courts, the drafters intended, as Barry Nicholas says, to create a body with limited powers
of legislative review, "conceding to the Conseil as few judicial char87
acteristics as possible.
For the French, the problem is more than just historical, and
not merely theoretical, because it raises real and practical concerns.
At stake are the goals of conflicting political agendas. To examine
the French system, and to recognize what the Conseil does, involves
a redefined notion of law in relation to politics. But it is naive to
believe, as one former member of the Conseil claims, that it is only
an "academic" question.88 It is, as Luchaire intimates, a political
act.8 9 Its resolution has profound consequences in two domains, the
political and the legal.
Politically, public criticism of the court and frank discussion of
its composition is more acceptable if the Conseil is considered a
political bodyY0 Perhaps because of the unresolved question over
the Conseil's nature, such criticism has itself provoked serious political controversy in the past few years.
Legally, certain consequences, many of them statutory, follow
from a juridical characterization of the Conseil. The attachment of
res'judicatato its decisions, the requirement that a court consider all
questions raised, the limited right of judges to certain redress or
remedies against those who act contemptuously of or try to influence the court, the limited right of others to sue for defamation for
statements made to a court, and the immunity of the state and of
judges for judicial acts, follow from a juridical characterization. Finally, judicial procedures which insure fairness to all those involved-and which serve as the justification for the immunity of
judges and the state--would apply to a juridical body. 9x
Membership
While there are numerous issues which divide opinion upon
85. Id. at 29.
86. Id. at 47.
87. Nicholas, "Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review in France," 1978 Pub. L
82, 84 (1978).
88. See infra n. 176 and accompanying text.

89. See Luchafre, Le Conseil Constitutionnel (1980).
90. Id. at 33.
91. Id. at 33-35 (1980).
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whether the Conseil is a court-and, by implication, on whether law
can be characterized in one way or another-none has been so divisive for the French-surprisingly so to an American--as its "original
sin", 92: the selection of its members. It has been called the "essence" of the dispute.93 Cappelletti and Cohen include the composition problem among their list of the Conseil's "congenital defects". 94
Upon the 1974 revisions to the 1958 Constitution, Patrick Juillard
noted that the revisions failed to produce the true Supreme Court
composed of independent members that its sponsors, critics of the
original 1958 arrangements, had desired.95 Brown has also observed
this "lack of independence". 96 Others have bemoaned the quality of
the Conseil's members, observing that "[v]ery few have distinguished themselves as legal scholars." Juillard contrasted this failure with the striking success of the U.S. Supreme Court to assert its
independence in Marbury v. Madison, and attributed the differences
to the selection of its members. 98
Similarly, Hauriou recognizes the selection process as a serious
problem. First, he tends to dismiss its relative significance in the
larger scheme of things, intimating that the Conseil has "essentially
a judicial nature".99 But then, in a rather typically French manner,
he finesses the problem by inventing a new category, the
"parajudicial" into which he claims the Conseil appropriately fits.1°°
Duverger does essentially the same when, recognizing the importance of the selection process, he characterizes the Conseil as "a
kind of a supreme political court". 10 '
Subject Matter
Tallon says-not quite mournfully-that the bar against review
of post-promulgation legislation creates an insuperable barrier between the Conseil and true judicial review along American lines.
This objection is raised by numerous critics, and Tallon's position is
92. Juillard, "L'Amenagement de l'Article 61 de la Constitution," 1974 Rev. Dr.
Pub. 1703, 1767.
93. Franck, Les Fonctionm Juridictionellesdu Conseil Constitutionnelet du Conseil d'Etat dana l'Ordre Constitutionnel 14 n. 6 (1974).
94. Cappelletti & Cohen, supra n. 75 at 47.
95. Juillard, supra n. 92 at 1703, 1723.
96. Supra n. 81.
97. Cappelletti & Cohen, supra n. 75 at 47. The effect on judicial independence
of such imponderables as status or even of such measurables as salary is, of course,
speculative. Waline notes that though the members of the Conseil are not formally
judges, they enjoy a "'comfortable' but not scandalously high," salary. Waline, "The
Constitutional Council of the French Republic," 12 Am. J. Comp. L 483-493 (1963).
98. Juillard, supra n. 92 at 1703, 1767.
99. Hauriou, supra n. 7 at 1093.
100. Id. at 1097.

101. Duverger, Droit constitutionnel et Institutions politiques 638 (4th ed. 1955)

(emphasis added).
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representative of its central point. The bar against such unlimited
review creates "[t]he main difference" between the French and
American systems, since it prevents the Conseil from recognizing,
and adapting constitutional law to "changing notions of constitutional rights." Therefore, he says, the Conseil can not be the
10 2
"keeper of the nation's conscience" like the U.S. Supreme Court.
Others raise the same point more obliquely or theoretically.
Thus, Juillard, whose theory Luchaire characterizes as the most
"compelling" (seduisante),10 3 insists that the Conseil is "institutional" rather than judicial. He elaborates a theory of constitutional
control characterized by two modalities of action with the judicial at
one pole and the institutional at the other. Our Supreme Court is,
to Juillard, the paradigm of an organ occupying the judicial
modality. 104
These two modalities share only one thing in common: "to assure the supremacy of the Constitution over Law". 10 5 Otherwise,
there is a profound difference between the two: whereas judicial
bodies operate to destroy law, institutional bodies operate in order to
create law. This distinction between bodies which "make" law and
those which "take" law has led one French scholar to conclude that
the Conseil is actually a legislative organ.' 0
Three fundamental differences reflect this profound distinction,
according to Juillard: the Conseil performs its work before the creation of legislation, it is exclusively dissociated from the application
of legislation to actual cases, and its control is exhaustive rather
than limited. Only the first is relevant here as a subject matter issue. It relates to the fact that Article 61 requires that the Conseil
act only prior to the promulgation of legislation. The second and
third are essentially due to the fact that there is no
07
contradictiousness.1
Non-contradictiousness
The two elements of Juillard's theory' 0 8 which address non-contradictiousness are the dissociation of proceedings from the application of legislation to actual cases and the fact of exhaustive rather
than limited control (that is, that a finding of unconstitutionality is
not limited to a particular case and particular litigants but exhaustively invalidates the law).
102.
103.
104.
105.

Tallon, supra n. 3 at 567, 575 (1979).
Luchaire, supra n. 9 at 17, 33 (1979).
Juillard, supra n. 92 at 1703, 1706 n. 4, 1707, and 1707 n. 8.
Id. at 1703, 1706.

106. Balat, supra n. 70.

107. See infra, text accompanying n. 108.
108. See supra, text accompanying n. 104.
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Dissociation of the proceedings from litigation is a matter of
non-contradictiousness, relating to the absence of any "case or controversy" requirement. According to strict, traditional French legal
theory,
A judicial body is one whose function is to apply the rule of
law to disputes brought before it by individuals asserting in
good faith contradictory arguments. 109
The notion of exhaustive rather than limited control is, also, a
feature of non-contradictiousness. It, too, is essentially a case or controversy issue, arising out of the absence of any adversary procedure
(controle au contentieux) and is due to a different type of constitutional norm, says Juillard, which the Conseil applies. Because the
norm applied by the Conseil controls the entire panoply of intra-governmental relationships (l'organisationet. .. functionnement des
pouvoirs publics) under separation of powers doctrine, rather than
provisions solely implicating individual rights, there is no requirement that a party show injury (there is, of course, no "party" in the
American sense at all). In discussing this issue, Juillard only uses
the English phrase, "standing to sue", because, he says, it is
"untranslateable".l"0
Procedure
Hamon emphasizes the lack of "the structured contribution of
interested parties to inform the court". 1 Chenot, a former member
of the Conseil, says:
I never thought for a moment that the Constitutional Council was a judicial organ; it is a political body by its membership and by the functions it performs.
[Tihere is no hearing before the Constitutional Council;
there is no hearing, there are no parties; there are no arguments and still less publicity of arguments. 112
Similarly, Waline emphasizes the entirely written nature of the procedures before the Conseil and the secrecy of deliberations. 113
Philip and Favoreu also recognize this as a potential criticism,
although they minimize its importance. 114 Nicholas, too, tends to
minimize the procedural problem. Although he notes that the short
time in which the Conseil must act "may produce ill-considered deci109. Juillard, supra n. 92 at 1703, 1708.

110. Id. at 1709.
111. Hamon, Institutions et vie politique,v. II at 262 (1975).
112. Chenot, Le domaine de la loi et des reglementg (colloquium at the University
of Aix-Marseille) at 134 (1977), cited in Luchaire, supra n. 79 at 27, 31.
113. Waline, supra n. 97 at 483-493.
114. Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 62 at 27.
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sions"," 5 he still considers the Conseil a judicial body, the problem
being simply that "[ilts procedure does not yet accord with its true
116
character."
Jurisdiction
Because the Conseil does not exercise exclusive control over
constitutionality, there are those who claim that it cannot be a true
Supreme Court. The possibility of inconsistent decisions between it
and the Council of State as well as the Cour de cassation, raises serious questions. Waline notes that the Conseil's shared power with at
least one other jurisdiction, the administrative courts, seriously undercuts the Conseil's position as a "supreme court", because, in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, there is always the possibility that
a decision will not be universally respected. 117 That possibility has
become the reality on three or four occasions."18
But the jurisdictional problem is the Conseil'smost paradoxical.
Due to the historical French view of judicial process, a claim that
the Conseil is a court can effectively limit, rather than enlarge, its
authority.
It is a circular argument, starting from the fact that French
courts have limited powers. The scope of a decision, the chose jugie,
binds only those involved in the particular dispute. Article 5 of the
Civil Code ensures that courts cannot issue arrets de reglement, extending their powers beyond the case."19 On the other hand, a legislative act has almost unlimited scope, actually making the law.
Thus, in an ironic twist, in order to avoid giving legislative
scope-"the sovereign authority of the rule of law"-to the Conseil's
decisions, the Government has effectively argued that the Conseil is
a court, having only "the simple authority of res judicata (chose
jugge)".mc In other words, it is only if one considers the Conseil to
be a court that it cannot exercise judicial review like the Supreme
Court! But this is more than mere irony, for the jurisdictional problem, if conceived as a bar to defining the Conseil as a judicial body, is
a problem only if it is first accepted as a court in the restrictive
French sense. It is therefore more a problem dictated by a political
agenda than one dictated by the inherent nature of the Conseil
constitutionnel.
115. Nicholas, supra n. 87 at 177, n. 2.
116. Id. at 177.
117. Waline, supra n. 97 at 483-493.
118. Supra n. 40.

119. See supra, text accompanying n. 16 and n. 15-29.

120. Favoreu & Philip, Lee grandea decisions du conseil constitutionnel 282 (2d
ed., 1979).
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InstitutionalDesign
A final criticism has been that the Conseil was intended, in
1958, to answer the institutional demands of a newly expanded executive for strict control over legislative intrusions into the executive's
expanded prerogatives. The thrust of this criticism, therefore, is
twofold: first, that the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution was not to create, out of the Conseil, a court; and, secondly,
that the Conseil was designed to maintain a supposed bias against
the legislature in favor of the executive. Michel Debr6, a kind of
Madison of the 1958 Constitution, more or less admitted this, calling
the Conseil a "special institution".' 2 '
And, it is substantially true that the Conseil was created by
deGaulle, or indirectly so through his agents, to be the handmaiden
of the executive. Serving solely to constrain the legislature, it can
be viewed in this way as merely another political organ. 122
Summary
Those who claim the Conseil is non-judicial because of the above
features apparently believe these features are non-judicial; that is,
that law does not consist of such features and is distinguished from
some other domain by their absence. Implicit therefore is the following jurisprudential belief: what courts do and what the executive
or legislature does are two different things. Courts are judicial, and
function within legal constraints. The constraints upon executive
and legislative functions, however, are not legal; they are political.
The jurisprudential problems facing both the French and ourselves
are similar, perhaps identical: defending the law/politics distinction
after the advent, for them, of "free scientific research",2 3 for us, of
Legal Realism. 12 4
ATTEMPTED RESOLUTIONS
The commentators address the foregoing issues from one of
three positions. Underlying each is an implicit view of the law/poli121. Debr6, Address to the Council of State, 27 August 1958, in Documents
d'Etsdes, Droit Constitutionnel et InstitutionsPolitiques 21 (1976).
122. Waline, "Foreword" to Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 120 at xi (1979). See Bermann, "French Treaties and French Courts: Two Problems in Supremacy," 28 Int
& Comp. LQ 458 (1979).
123. Geny, supra n. 21; Ehrlich, Freie Rechkfndung und Freie Rechtswisenscwhft (1903); id., Soziologle und Jurisprudenz (1906); Flavius, Der Kampf um die
Rechtwissenschaft (1906); see, David, Intnt? EncycL of Comp. L, Vol. II, Ch. III, 3269 (1984).
124. Tushnet, "Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy," 8 U. Dayton L
Rev. 809 (1983).
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tics distinction. The conventional position maintains the distinction;
the skeptical position questions it; the avoidance position ignores it.
1. The conventional position uses untested inductive premises,
yielding two approaches, the functional and the formal. The functional adopts some jurisprudential definition, applying it to various
Conseil attributes. Within this are two progressively more particular variants, the evolutionary and the ironic. The formal approach
holds that a juridical nature is determined by an organ's structural
status within public institutions or its textual status within the Constitution and laws.
2. The skeptical position regards juridicality as problematical,
chimerical and contingent. The dominant approach is realist-skeptical, holding that an organ's juridical nature depends upon sociological factors. A logical extension of that would be critical-skeptical,
viewing the issue as problematical because difference between legal
and political, between judicial and legislative, is merely one of strategy and agenda and that jurisprudential definitions are a product of
political goals.
3. The avoidance position simply finesses the issue.
The Conventional Position
A.

Functional

Most critics adopt functional arguments, reaching their conclusions, much like the formalist, by analogy to other political or judicial institutions. For instance, Waline argues that the judicial nature
of a state organ is determined more by its acts and functions, than
by its form or its label. Under his theory, a state organ acts judicially when it fulfills two requirements. The first is formel (in the
sense of the formal organization of state organs and their respective
powers): the decisions must be binding on other state organs
(l'autorite de la chose jugde), not as res judicata estoppel, but as a
finality which distinguishes a judicial decision from an advisory
opinion. The second is materiel (in the sense of the subject matter
of the decisions, not in the sense of a strict procedural-substantive
dichotomy): its decisions must be based upon and expressed by reference to positive, State-derived law. 128 Having posited these two re125. Note that this part of Waline's test is more formalistic than functional.
Waline, "Foreword" to Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 120 at vi. Franck conducts a parallel analysis, reaching much the same conclusions. The formel and organique features of a judicial body, according to him, include its organization, membership,

independence, and procedures. The materiel features include the resolution of disputes, the use of rules of law, and the goal of maintaining the juridical order.
Franck, supra n. 93 at 14-27. The terms are confusing because, deriving from the
civil law formal/material method for classifying state organs, they are almost the re-

verse of English terminology: theformel element is a substantive one relating to the
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quirements, Waline insists that: "A judicial body (jurisdiction) is
essentially defined by the two already indicated elements, and by
them alone."'' 2 But in the final analysis, Waline's reasons seem
more inductive than ineluctably logical and derive whatever persuasive force they have from an intuitive argument based on reference
to organs that seem indisputably judicial or, as he says, those which
are "unanimously considered to be judicial". 12 It is only through
such an appeal to intuitive common sense that this part of the argument is justified.
Waline denies that it is inconsistent, or at least nonjudicial, for a
state organ to possess some nonjudicial traits. He insists that a state
organ can, in effect, have two characters. 2 8
Waline also disposes, almost too easily it would seem, of the
classical requirement for adversary proceedings, noting bodies which
are non-adversary but whose juridicality "no one doubts".129 The ultimate recourse to what "no one doubts" is troublesome. The argument is even more vulnerable in light of his claim that state organs
can have multiple characters. It is not clear, when he refers for inductive proof to organs that "no one doubts" are judicial, that it is
their judicial traits, rather than their non-judicial ones, which support his argument.
In other words, if the Conseil can be judicial at times and nonjudicial at others, it must be equally possible, statutory command
aside, for the Cour des comptes to be nonjudicial at times, despite
the fact that "no one doubts" it may be judicial at others. Thus, reference to noncontentious Cour proceedings hardly proves, at a jurisprudential level, that the Conseil is a judicial body unless it is first
demonstrated that these proceedings constitute the judicial part of
the Cour'sactivity. But that, of course, is the conclusion that Waline
is trying to reach and he can hardly use it as his premise.
Waline implies from this (though nowhere explicitly states) a
difference between the presence of adverse parties and the presence
of competing issues. One need not have adverse parties to have a judicial proceeding, says Waline, and thus even if the Conseil frequently acts without such opposing parties (en presence de deux
prdtentionsopposges),1se there are clearly constitutional issues raised
and a decision between such competing issues. Because these deciactual authority accorded a decision by the other organs of the State; the materiel
element is really a formal one, see infra, n. 165-166 and accompanying text, in our
terms, because it only addresses such features as the language used by the organ.
126. Waline, "Foreword" to Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 120 at vi.
127. Id. at v.
128. Id. at vi.
129. Id.
130. Id. at viii.
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sions have binding force and are articulated in terms of positive law,
Waline's requirements of juridicality are met.
Taking an equally functional approach, Waline says that the
composition of the Conseil must be judged by practical assurances of
independence, not by abstract formalistic notions.131 He rejects the
notion that the Conseil is biased in favor of the executive but he relies on an assumption incompatible with judicial independence: the
Conseil cannot be partial to the executive "if one realizes that two
thirds of its members are named by the presidents of the two parliamentary assemblies."' 3 2 Moreover, any such argument as Waline's,
which relies upon a comparison with the High Court of Justice,
rings hollow when one considers that the High Court itself has been
described as "basically a court of an exceptional character, con' 33
cerned with rendering politicaljustice.'
Luchaire advances an equally functional argument, claiming
that it is not useful to assign juridicality to an entire state organ but
only to its various functions. 134
[C]an it be said that that there is never a hearing, nor parties, nor opposing debates before the Constitutional Council? Certainly not ....135
He notes that when a law is reviewed under Article 61, all of the
major government bodies and officials are notified and each can submit written arguments; the same is essentially true of the real differences of position in an Article 37 proceeding when the
Government effectively responds to the implied claims of the Parlement which enacted the questioned laws.
In each of these situations, Luchaire notes the significant presence of dispute (contestation), the resolution of which becomes an
important criterion of judicial action. Moreover, even where parties
do not raise the issue, such as in the self-assertion of jurisdiction
over organic laws (the non-contentious issues of which Waline
speaks), it is not how the dispute is raised so much as its existence; it
is not the presence or absence of an individual raising the question
which determines the judicial nature of the institution but, rather,
3 6
the function performed.
Luchaire fashions a functional definition, concluding the Conseil
is judicial because of his two "criteria of juridicality":
131. Id. at viii.
132. Id. at xi.
133. Auby & Ducos-Ader, DroitPublic 121 (6th ed., 1976).
134. See supra, n. 46-49 and accompanying text. There is no disagreement that,
recognizing the widely diverging and various responsibilities of the Conseil, not all,
if any, of Its functions can be judicial.

135. Luchaire, supra n. 79 at 34.

136. Id. at 35.
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[T]here is a (contentious) judicial decision when there is a
resolution by a definitive decision of an adversely disputed
matter bearing on a question of law....
[T]here is also a judicial decision when there is a response accorded judicial finality to a question of law, even
in
the absence of adversely disputed matters (toute
contestation).... 137
Luchaire explains that his formula is two-fold to include both
Waline's argument 38 and Juillard and Hamon's requirement of contentiousness 39 and to recognize that it is when finality is unclear
that juridicality is most frequently questioned.
Thus, where the Constitution specifically supplies res judicata
effect (Article 62) 140 all that is required to conclude an organ is judicial is that it couch its decision in legal terms. On the other hand,
where res judicata is not expressly mandated by constitution or statute, a conclusion of juridicality is supplied only by a final resolution
of adverse interests. But it is the very finality of the resolution
which seems at issue, for only judicial decisions have that character.
As Balat notes, 141 this is circular. Under Luchaire's test, given adverse interests, a conclusion of juridicality is apparently in the hands
of the organ itself.
Equally surprisingly, Luchaire concludes that the Conseil's composition is irrelevant to its juridical nature. In an argument bottomed upon the law/politics distinction, he states that a political
nature implies political accountability in that, unless a body is accountable and responsible to a political group, it is meaningless to
call it political. In this sense, the government is accountable to the
Parliament which can dissolve it and the President is accountable to
the people who possess the powers of referendum, censure, and reelection; the Conseil, however, is accountable to no one. i 42 Equally
important, Luchaire claims that even the membership of the Conseil
137. Id. at 37.
138. See supra, text preceding and accompanying n. 125.
139. Hamon, supra n. 111 at v. II; Juillard, supra n. 92 at 1703; see also supra, text
accompanying n. 103-107.
140. I use the term res judicata basically because the French refer to it in that
way (chose jugde). However, in the context of Conseil proceedings, it is very much
the same as the term staredecisis. This is partly due to the fact that, as a student of
mine observed, the two terms tend to merge when there are no parties involved.
However, it is mostly due to the fact that the French simply do not freely acknowledge the concept of stare decisi8 with all its threat of chronological hierarchy. Instead, they seek a more modest form of finality in res judicata. To the extent that
Lambert is right, see supra n. 29 and accompanying text, French resjudicataleads to
stare decisis anyway.
141. Balat, supra n. 70 at 16-17.
142. Luchalre, supra n. 79 at 33.
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cannot affect its juridical nature, as long as it operates as a judicial
body, because, separating recruitment from function, juridicality depends upon what is done, not upon who does it.'4
More than most other functional arguments, Luchaire's seems
premised upon a jurisprudential definition rather than an ad hoc
one. He strongly implies that the formal argument has things backwards; he demonstrates that the political composition of the Conseil
does not determine its juridical nature; its composition is a matter or
prudence, not principle. It is only after he concludes that the Conseil is judicial that he then asks the question: "Does its composition
assure the guarantees of independence of impartiality and of competence that everyone expects of a court?"'"4 He thus relegates the
membership problem to a secondary, non-definitive, position. Implicitly recognizing that there may be "courts" which do not meet
our expectations of independence, he insists that their judicial nature nevertheless remains.
Balat starts from a formal position, but quickly demonstrating
that formalism leads nowhere, 4 5 develops a jurisprudential definition of juridicality which differs little from Luchaire's. Unlike most
other functionalists, Balat, in developing an inductive definition of
juridicality, relies heavily upon many other foreign jurisdictions in
addition to the United States. I 4 His conclusion, however, is highly
idiosyncratic: the Conseil, when it determines the constitutionality
of laws, is neither political, judicial, nor entirely unique; it is a legislative organ! He suggests that the Conseil abandon its juridical
pretensions, and "its editorial style which only specialists can decipher," because "in a democracy, power should not be obscure or secret",'147 and finally implores, "If only the Constitutional Council
would 'kill the whereases, never would a death have been so
just! "148

In questioning the supposed institutional bias of the Conseil towards the executive, Bermann, too, employs a functional argument.
He notes that the one-way nature of the Conseil's procedures is
more apparent than real and more textually formal than functional,
since Article 34, though only expressly limiting Parlement,can effectively determine the executive's powers also. 14 9 Thus, juridicality
cannot be determined solely by labels nor even by constitutional
143. Id. at 27.
144. Id. at 27, 52 (1979).
145. See Balat, supra n. 70 at 25.
146. Id. at 20-21, 51-52, 56-57, 63-65.
147. Id. at 79-80.
148. Id. at 80, quoting Larche, "Le Conseil constitutionnel organe du pouvoir
d'Etat," 1972 A.J.D.A. 137 (March 1972).
149. Waline makes a similar observation.

Waline, "Foreword" to Favoreu &

Philip, supra n. 120 at xi.
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text but only by the final operational result. 15
1.

Evolutionary-Functional

Within the functionalists there are those who believe an organ
can develop judicial characteristics through time. There is more
than a touch of legal realism to this approach. Rivero's argument
emphatically embraces the Conseil as a judicial institution. His analysis, however, emphasizes the development of the Conseil over time,
relating it to social and political developments. In his view, the juridical nature of an organ, and in a way one's definition of law, is
indeterminate without reference to, and thus contingent upon, the
social environment. Rivero is untroubled by the exact textual constitutional source of the Conseil, its method of designating members,
and even the limitations on "standing". He notes that the Conseil
has adopted procedures and positions which have gained public confidence; and that the Conseil's acts contradicted the pessimistic expectations of some early critics, effectively establishing new
constitutional tradition. 151 He concludes, "the Conseil's judicial nature, which had been doubted on account of its consultative functions, is no longer denied."'1 52 Clearly, unless one takes Goguel's
position that the question is merely "academic",'53 Rivero's position
that the judicial nature of the Conseil simply grew, surprising everyone, is curious. The nature of the Conseil, apparently, does not depend upon exclusively "legal" factors, because its nature depends
upon people's reactions and the passage of history.154 It seems possible under Rivero's view that what could be judicial could also be
political, depending upon circumstances. If the French had been
more reluctant--or, perhaps, hasty-to use the Conseil or if its
members had been less bold--or, perhaps, more cautious-it might
have been a purely political organ. 155
a.

Ironic-Evolutionary-Functional

An even more specific variant of the evolutionary might be
called the ironic. It implies that Parliament unwittingly created a
Frankenstein's monster,156 and that though the original intent was
150. Bermann, supra n.122 at 484.

151. See Rivero, "The Constitutional Protection of Human Rights in French
Law," 12 Irish Jurist 1, 10-11 (1979).

152. Id. at 10.
153. See, infra n. 175 and accompanying text.
154. See Boucher, "Defates," Le Monde (14 January 1977). (The Conseil is an
"adolescent jurisdiction".)
155. See also von Mehren & Gordley, supra n. 4. ('"The question remains whether

the Council may, in time, evolve into a true court... By 1976, certain events suggest
that such an evolution may be under way.")
156. Baudouin, answering the government's claim that the Conseil was not a judi-

HeinOnline -- 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 71 1986

72

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 34

not to create a judicial organ, the framers were mistaken about judicial characteristics and created a court in spite of their intentions.
The substance of this variant is that not only can a judicial nature
evolve but it can defy a clearly contrary desire.
Those who claim the intent was to create a non-judicial organ
are on fairly secure ground, of course. Debr6's statement to that effect, 157 just prior to the Constitution's adoption, is relatively authoritative.1 58 But Waline contrasts that intent with the actual effect of
the 1958 Constitution which, he claims, was to create a court.'5 9
Bermann also maintains that though the framers of the Constitution did not intend to create a court, they did so nonetheless, and
produced an organ which performs what is, in substance, judicial review. This highly functional position reduces the need to examine
the exact juridical nature of the limitations on the Conseil by denying the import, if not the reality, of those limitations. Sanguine, for
instance, about the jurisdictional problem, he states that a belief
that there should be no conflict between the Conseil and the Council
of State "simply will not wash", because, though the drafters might
have "intended" two different "border guards", they only intended
one "frontier". 160 It may be, however, that the drafters intended not
two different guards, but two different phenomena, only one of
which was a guard. What the other was intended to be, other then
161
quite French, is obscure.
B.

Formal

To some jurists the Conseil is unassailably judicial on generally
textual grounds. Often proceeding by analogy, the assumptions remain largely untested, sometimes unstated. For instance, to BlancJouvan and Boulouis, the "fact" of finality, from Article 62 of the
cial body, warned that such a claim would risk creating a "hybrid and juridically
monstrous being which would represent a fourth power of a nameless nature." C.E.
12 December 1969, 170 A.. 103.
157. Supra n. 121 and accompanying text.
158. Debr6's position, of course, must be qualified by the Constitution's subsequent history, especially the 1974 amendments increasing the Conseil's jurisdiction
to include saisine by 60 senators or deputies. It might be that they tipped the scales.
But in view of the post-1974 criticisms, it is clear that the critics do not believe so.
See supra, n. 92 and accompanying text, and infra n. 171 and accompanying text.
159. Waline, "The Constitutional Council of the French Republic," 12 Am. J.

Comp. L 483, 487 (1963). This is effectively the position of Favoreu and Philip as
well. See Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 120.
160. Bermann, supra n. 122 at 484.
161. In other words, when Bermann says the Framers intended to create two sets
of guards, the distinction between intent and result becomes confused. It is possible
the drafters intended only one guard, but ironically created two, not realizing that
people who walk back and forth at the border carrying guns are guards, no matter

how they are chosen, what uniform they wear, what they are called, or even whose
orders they obey.
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Constitution of 1958, is conclusive whatever its actual scope and,
therefore, Conseil decisions are definitionally "authoritative". 162 To
say that the Conseil's decisions are "authoritative", however, is to ignore the fact that both other French jurisdictions-the administrative and ordinary courts--have refused to be bound by a broad
reading of the Conseil's jurisprudence (in the French sense of case
law). 16 3 And Jouvan and Boulouis read Article 62 with undue
credence, for evidence of finality is solely derived from that textual
provision.
Likewise, in the materiel phase of Waline's two-part test, 164 the
language the organ employs determines its juridicality (a court is
one which employs "positive law" in its decisions).las Substantially
formalistic, this materiel phase assumes that simply labelling such
language "legal" makes it so. 166
At times, even the Conseil has adopted a formal or textual argument in characterizing itself. In its Decision of 16 January 1962,167
the Conseil refused to respond to the delegalization request by the
Prime Minister to decide under Article 37, para. 2, whether a law relating to agricultural prices impermissibly attempted to address an
area properly regulated only by executive decree. In two earlier decisions it had declared that agricultural prices were an executive responsibility, although it never formally delegalized the underlying
agricultural law, that law never having been directly challenged.
But those prior decisions had decided that the subject matter was of
an executive, not legislative, character. So, in this decision it simply
dismissed the request of the prime minister because it "must be regarded as without object", because the issue had already been decided. This was exclusively, in fact circularly, grounded on Article
62 which declares prior decisions of the Conseil binding. The Conseil held that such binding authority extended to the reasons as well
as the results of its decisions. 168
This case is generally viewed to hold that the Conseil considers
itself to be a court since to dismiss a case as "without object" based
162. Blanc-Jouvan & Boulouis, InternationalEncyclopedia of ComparativeLaw,
Vol. I, National Reports, F-53 (1972).
163. See supra n. 40. The entire passage includes a functional reason, as well, for
reaching a juridical conclusion:

A provision declared unconstitutional may be neither promulgated nor applied. Both from the formal or organic point of view and from that of the
subject it deals with, it appears indisputable that the Constitutional Council

is a real court.
Blanc-Jouvan & Boulouis, supra n. 162 at F-53.
164. See, supra, text accompanying n. 125.
165. Waline, "Foreword" to Favoreu & Philip, supra n. 120 at vi. See supra n. 125.
166. See supra, n. 125 and accompanying text.

167. Journel Officiel, 25 February 1962 at 1915.
168. Decision of 16 January 1962, Journel Officiel, 25 February 1962 at 1915.
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on previously decided issues is, within the civil law tradition, to assume a judicial posture. 16 9 There is, however, no discussion within
the decision, except the above reference to Article 62, which offers
any jurisprudential support for the claim that the scope of its decisions extends to their underlying reasons.
The Skeptics
Bermann exemplifies the realist-skeptic when he somewhat
quizzically questions whether "direct accessibility" has any essential
connection with juridicality. 170 He is equally skeptical about the selection process as a determinant of judiciality. In true skeptical
fashion, his comments imply that any choice of judicial characteris171
tics is always arbitrary.
Bermann's "border guard" metaphor' 72 and his conclusion that
such shared jurisdiction is not inconsistent with a judicial nature, is
the realist-skeptical articulation of the view that judicial activity lies
along a continuum, is difficult to pin down, but is nevertheless not
impossible to identify functionally. It is realistic and skeptical as
well because it presciently recognized, well before it was fully realized, that Article 34 decisions had the potential of expanding as well
17 3
as limiting legislative competence.
Perhaps not surprisingly, there has been no critic until now' 74
who has advanced a critical-skeptical approach. However, the government itself has furnished sufficient evidence upon which to base
such an approach. For instance, when the Conseil's decisions have
been favorable, the government has urged that the Conseil is something other than a court. But when it has disagreed with the Conseil's decisions, the government, too, has claimed that the Conseil is
a court whose decisions have only the narrow scope which, in its
opinion, would-or, more accurately, should-be accorded a judicial
body. 175 Of course, for the government to adopt a purely prudential
position is not surprising or, perhaps, even objectionable.
The Avoidance Approach
As long as the law/politics distinction remains important, the
169. The rejection of the Conseil's decision of 28 November 1973, is in many ways
a rejection of the breadth claimed here.
170. Bermann, supra n. 122 at 484 (1979).
171. Bermann, Comment 11, 27 Am. J. Comp. L 567, 584 (1979).
172. See supra, text accompanying n. 160.
173. See Philip, "Le Developement du Controle de Constitutionnalite," 1983
R.D.P. 401, 498. See also, Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision 81-142 DC du 27 jufllet
1982; Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision 82-143 DC du 30 juillet 1982.
174. See text, infra at 89-91.
175. See supra n. 120 at 167.
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jurisprudential dilemma presented by the Conseil is avoided only
with a certain diffidence. Thus, a member of the Conseil itself has
claimed that it hardly matters whether the Conseil is a court or not,
the issue being entirely "academic" to him.176 One might just as
well adopt Hauriou's terminology and characterize the nature of the
Conseil as "parajudicial". 177 Debr6's position'7" was that the Conseil
is neither fish nor fowl. 179 It is a "special institution", a "great and
necessary innovation" dedicated to a special, even unique, task.
Even Waline, who ascribes to the Conseil a judicial character,
could not avoid describing the Conseil's originally intended mission
in a way differing subtantially from that of a court. The "principal
reason" for the Conseil was to sanction legislative intrusions upon
the executive domain.1is In other words, it was not explicitly conceived as a court of judicial review but more ambiguously as a sui
generis organ of regulation. Whereas Waline, however, nevertheless
concludes that it eventually evolved into a judicial body, Chatenet
insists that this sui generis character, in fact, is what prevents the
Conseil from being considered a juridical body;' 8 ' for much the same
reasons, Juillard says:
The Constitutional Council is certainly not a judicial bodyso be it. We will prefer to say here that it amounts to an
original body (organe original),acting in a judicial form. 8 2
But this argument, like the label "parajudicial", merely avoids the
problem. Similarly, when Neuborne nonchalantly announces that
"the Conseil constitutionnelis a cross between a political arbiter and
a court,"'ls this should, in the context of his article, shock. His entire point is that certain practices of the Conseil could profitably be
adopted by the Supreme Court, and it is not clear how such adoption
could be accomplished if the two institutions are one, fish, one,
fowl.' 84
The avoidance approach tends to hide behind unexamined terminology which labels the problem out of existence. These labels,
however, though they describe the Conseil after a fashion, provide
very little insight. It should not be surprising, though, that the
176. Goguel, "Le Conseil Constitutionnel," 1979 Rev. Dr. Pub. 5, 25.
177. See supra, text accompanying n. 99.
178. See supra, text accompanying n. 121 and 158.
179. A vineophile student of mine comments that this is certainly no problem: a
nice Bordeaux should do.
180. Waline, supra n. 159 at 485.
181. Chatenet, Le domaine de la ioi et des regemtents, Colloquium at the University of Aix-Marseille, at 134 (1977).
182. Jullard, supra n.92 at 1703, 1708.
183. Neuborne, "Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the
United States," 57 N.Y. U.L Rev. 363, 388 n. 91 (1982).
184. See, Rodgers & Hammerstein, Showboat, "Can't Help Loving That Man of
Mine," (".

..

fish gotta swim, birds gotta fly...")
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avoidance approach is essentially, and minimally, descriptive. Just
as the formalist approach provides no analysis, the avoidance approach studiously refuses one. Coining a neologism provides a refuge from the controversy. It may be true that, instead of performing
substantive constitutional review (whether judicial or otherwise) the
Conseil was to regulate "the distribution of law-making
power ... .,,185 But to observe the Conseil's unique regulatory powers is to avoid understanding them, "because this 'regulation' could
be judicial or could be political; it is therefore not an answer.'"186
Luchaire observes that Juillard's solution 8 7 of creating a new rubric, the "institutional", clouds rather than furthers the inquiry. To
say that the "institutional" Conseil acts to create law while the "judicial" Austrian Supreme Court acts to destroy it is, to Luchaire, a
18 8
semantic non sequitur.
In addition, says Luchaire, Juillard ignores Article 37, which allows post-promulgation review, however limited, and the fact that
Anglo-Saxon courts occasionally enjoin legislation prior to its application. Furthermore, Luchaire questions whether full constitutional
review under Article 61 is materially different from Articles 37 and
41. The same question, he notes, can be asked about both: "does it
bear upon matters relating to the legislative domain?" 1 9
The avoidance position, of course, cannot be addressed jurisprudentially, since it rejects any jurisprudential argument. That rejection, however,
is accomplished by adopting an implicit political
position. 19o
Goguel's dismissal of "academic" questions is disingeuous. It inevitably asserts its own legitimacy while denying legitimacy to its
critics. When Goguel claims that he "doesn't care" about the academic question, he wraps himself in a robe of apparent neutrality
and implicitly claims a purely descriptive role: this is how it is, not
how it should be, I take no academic (read, perhaps, "political")
position.
A POINT OF COMPARISON

With the exception of those who adopt avoidance arguments,
the critics all share one thing in common: an implicit reference to
recognized judicial bodies, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, as judicial models. The comparison with the U.S. Supreme Court is pervasive, influential, and perhaps even decisive. A close examination
185.
186.
187.
188.

Beardsley, "Constitutional Review in France," 1975 S. C Rev. 189, 225.
Luchaire, supra n. 9 at 17, 31.
See supra, text accompanying n. 103.
Luchaire, supra n. 79 at 34.

189. Id. at 27, 33-34.
190. See text, supra at 57-60.
HeinOnline -- 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 76 1986

1986]

DAVIS: CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

of these arguments must, therefore, start with an examination of
this one common underlying premise. 191
Membership
It is surprising that the membership issue has so dominated
French jurists that they term it the Conseil's "original sin"'192 because it is, of all the issues, the most easily challenged. Bermann
simply noted the fact that many American judges are elected to
fixed terms or appointed for political reasons, "yet this is not generally thought to make them any the less judges, or the courts they sit
193
on any the less courts.'
Political influence upon the Supreme Court membership, indeed, is so vividly demonstrated through both doctrine and history
that the issue seems almost silly. Roosevelt's "court packing" plan
starkly illuminated the political nature of the appointment process.' 9 4 His campaign to seize constitutional control from the "nine
old men" was spearheaded by a movement largely initiated by a popular book of the same name. 195 The attempt and ability of the Executive to "stack" the Supreme Court remains current and
controversial, having re-entered national politics in the 1984 presidential debates, during which time it was claimed that the Republican presidential platform was committed to stacking the Court with
anti-abortion members.
The membership problem addresses the absence of required
qualifications for members of the Conseil, not just the political selection. But while U.S. Supreme Court judges have historically been
lawyers, there is no constitutional requirement. Furthermore, the
Court has held that legal training is not essential to a judicial-as
opposed to Article III-position. The important issue, said the
Court, is "the need for independent, neutral, and detached judgment, not.., legal training."' 96
When Cappelletti and Cohen bemoan the Conseil's lack of
191. The comparison to the U.S. Supreme Court sometimes seems almost obsessive. It is the Court which most often-almost invariably-serves as the paradigm of
the judicial organ. See for instance, Juillard, supra n. 92 at 1703, 1706 n. 4, 1707, and

1707 n. 8., as well as Luchaire, supra n.79 at 17, 34, as well as, of course, Lambert,
supra n. 14.
192. See supra n. 92 and accompanying text.
193. Bermann, Comment II, 27 Am J. Comp. L. 583, 584 (1979).
194. Murphy & Pritchett, Courts, Judges, and Politics 376-379 (3rd ed. 1979) (citing Roosevelt speech of 9 March 1937); Senate Report No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pp. 41-44).
195. Pearson & Allen, The Nine Old Men (1936); see also, Pearson & Allen, Nine
Old Men at the Crossroads(1937). It is interesting to note that the age of the members of the Conseil has also been a continuing, though minor, concern to French authors who discuss it, unsurprisingly, with reference to our Supreme Court.
196. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 337, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 2713, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1976).
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scholarship, 197 it should be recalled that the same criticism has occasionally been levelled against the justices of the Supreme Court,
only a handful of whom have consistently received unanimously
198
high grades.
Finally, it is true, unlike members of the Conseil, Supreme
Court justices are entitled to life tenure (although, as Bermann
noted, many state court judges are not) and, indeed, life tenure is
one of the two basic features that the Supreme Court has identified
in distinguishing Article III judges from others (the other being protection from diminution in salary). 199 However, many Supreme
Court justices have decided not to serve so long. Ironically, one criticism of the court is that it is frequently top-heavy with elderly
2° °
judges as a result of life tenure.
Furthermore, Supreme Court justices are guaranteed life tenure
only during "good behavior". There have been numerous attempts
to impeach Supreme Court justices, some for no more than political
reasons. 20 1 There is nothing to indicate such political reasons could
20 2
not constitute impeachable offenses.
Subject Matter
At first blush, limiting the Conseil's subject matter to pre-promulgation review of legislation seems a serious defect since first, its
limited review is not enriched by the facts of litigated cases and, second, it cannot serve as the "keeper of the nation's conscience". But
though there is no such express limitation on the Supreme Court's
subject matter, whether the Court effectively observes such a limitation is not so obvious.
There is reason to think, for example, that the Supreme Court
subjects new practices to greater constitutional scrutiny than old
and accords old practices some presumption of legitimacy. Justice
197. See supra, n. 97 and accompanying text.
198. Blaustein & Mersky, "Rating Supreme Court Justices," 58 A.B.A.J. 1183
(1972).
199. Northern Pipeline Const. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
200. Grossman, "Book Review," 1980 Wi& L Rev. 429, 432.
201. The first attempt to impeach Justice Douglas was based on his issuance of a
stay of execution in the Rosenberg case. 1953 CongressionalQuarterlyAlmanac 311312. The second, 17 years later, was largely based on Douglas' authorship of articles
which allegedly either favored leftist causes, appeared in disreputable journals, or
both. 1970 CongressionalQuarterly Almanac 1025-1027.
202. What, then, is an impeachable offense? The only answer is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers it to be at a given moment in history....
Representative Gerald Ford, 116 Cong. Rec. H. 3113 (daily ed. 15 April 1970). See
Berger, Impeachment- The ConstitutionalProblems (1973).
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Rehnquist, for one, has expressly recognized this. 203 But because
such a notion might offend the theory of a supra-legislative norm
justifying judicial review, the existence of such a subject-matter limitation has been denied-most notably, however, in the context of a
2 4
case where such a limitation may well have been applied. 0
This is not to imply that the Court acts nonjudicially when it
proceeds judiciously. It is good sense for the Court to respect timehonored practices. To expect and require a court to exercise unlimited powers of review over well-established legislation and practices
for it to qualify for judicial status reflects a romantic misreading of
Supreme Court history.
Finally, actual practice belies the idea that the Court's supposed
policy of unrestricted judicial review allows it to function as a moral
policeman. Even Marbury v. Madison 2 5 does not quite illustrate
what the French critics claim, for the birth of American judicial review occurred in the court's own manger. It did not deny Congress
any power to act; it rather declined to act itself, declaring its own
jurisdiction narrower than what Congress had opined in the 1789 Judiciary Act.
More importantly, however, if the subject matter limitation
under which the Conseil acts prevents it from being "the keeper of
the nation's conscience", 2°6 by preventing judicial recognition of
changing notions of morality, it is unlikely that, for instance, the
passage of the 14 years between 1789 and 1803 in Marbury is good
evidence that the Supreme Court is free to so act. This is not sufficiently long a passage to support the claim that the Court is adapting
the law to changing standards of morality: for all practical purposes,
federal legislation more than twenty years old is never invalidated.
The average time period between enactment of federal legislation
and declaration of unconstitutionality is nine and one-half years.
Thus, legislation older than twenty years seems to enjoy a limit
equally as protective as the post-promulgation limit under which the
203. While a particular course of executive conduct to which there was no
opportunity for the legislative branch to effectively object cannot conclusively establish a constitutional authoritative judicial decision, a long continued practice on the part of the Executive, acquiesced in by the Congress, is
itself some evidence of the existence of constitutional authority to support
such a practice."
Rehnquist, "The Constitutional Issues-Administrative Position," in Falk(ed.), The
Vietnam War and International Law, Vol. III, The Widening Context 167 (1972),
originally in 45 N.Y U. L Rev. 628 (1970).
204. A long standing but erroneous pattern of statutory interpretation may
not be spared from the force of a constitutional mandate by reason of its
longevity.
Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
205. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
206. Supra n. 102 and accompanying and preceding text.
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Conseil operates. 20 7 Unless one finds routine invalidation of federal
legislation considerably older than that, old enough, in fact, to allow
for changes in matters of morality, the notion that the Court can
meaningfully and importantly function in this way is seriously
suspect.
In the few other instances where the Court has accomplished
major changes in old legislative settings, it has acted as a maker
rather than a taker of the law. 208 In its expansive interpretation of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it declared nothing unconstitutional. It
instead found room in the statutory language for greater remedies.20 9 It would seem that to claim the Conseil is not a court on this
basis is simply to misstate as well as misread history. To imply that
the Supreme Court has carte blanche to overrule well-established
210
legislation would be to turn the exception of Plessy v. Ferguson
into a rule-and to ignore the fact that Plessy, of course, overruled
court-made law, not legislation.
Note that it is not only the bar against post-promulgation review but also the very fact of pre-promulgation review that seems
nonjudicial to some critics. The claim is essentially that review of
legislation before it is applied is a legislative activity, and that, absent a real case or controversy, the richness of any potential argument is lost if an organ is allowed to "judge" legislation before the
law has been applied.
But the Supreme Court has steadily increased its early review
of legislation-functionally not much different than pre-promulgation review-to the extent that it allows injunctive relief against the
very application of legislation. 211 When statutes are facially violative
of important rights, the Court is willing to invalidate them broadly
and quickly. 212 Granted, most such review is limited to cases in
which there is at least an allegation of bad faith or harassment.
However, to the extent that there is something non-judicial about
such review, the Conseil and the Supreme Court both suffer that de213
fect. Even the Court has voiced concern over this.
207. This figure was computed from a list of all federal legislation declared unconstitutional in whole or in part by the U.S. Supreme Court; Witt (ed.), Guide to
the US. Supreme Court, 926-931 (1979). Naturally, this does not conclude state legislation which, perhaps, might be invalidated more readily by the Court after a considerably longer amount of time. But, then again, it might not. The important point is
that these statistical data certainly do not support Waline's thesis and it would thus
seem unwise to accept that thesis as gospel absent some countervailing empirical
information.
208. See supra, text accompanying n. 106.

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
163 U.S. 537 (1896); see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-53 (1971).
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Non-Contradictiousness
The case or controversy doctrine supposedly assures contradictiousness; judicial intrusion into the legislative domain is prevented
by maintaining the model of traditional common law litigation in
Supreme Court practices. A case thus involves two litigants who
14
share a private dispute.
But Supreme Court practice, especially during this century,
reveals a radical departure from this model. A substantial part of its
caseload focuses on classic public issues such as voting rights,215 community organization,2 16 and public morals.2 17 There are no parties
in the classic sense. Instead of two, polar, individuals controlling litigation over private rights, the disputes have snowballed into massive multi-faceted conflicts over public rights in which dispute
occurs as often over representation and tactics as over which party is
advancing which claim. The abandonment of the "bipolar" litigation
model has brought "greatly enlarged opportunities for use of consti218
tutional litigation as an instrument of reform.
In other words, the supposed American model used by French
jurists to criticize the mechanism which brings disputes before the
Conseil is inaccurate. The model of individuals coming to the
Supreme Court unaffected by larger political issues and organizations either does not exist or occupies a minor place in Supreme
Court litigation. It is substantially that phenomenon-the perversion of the traditional bipolar dispute through the presence, indeed
influence, of additional parties, especially political groups-which
critics of the Conseil claim prevents it from being a court.
To imagine, therefore, that the Supreme Court remains a pure
model of classical two-party litigation is simply naive. The radical
alteration of Supreme Court litigation, and the American judicial
structure generally, has provoked profound questions over the nature of the judicial process. The substitution of "polycentric" for
"bipolar" litigation models has caused American scholars to re-examine courts and juridicality and to conclude that the line between
judicial and political adjudication is, at best, obscure.2 1 9 Critics of
the Conseil who use American procedures as their model seem ignorant of that alteration and the discussion it has provoked.
One source of that alteration is the growing participation of
214.
(1978).
215.
216.
217.

See Fuller, '"Te Forms and Limits of Adjudiciation," 92 Harv. L Rev. 353
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

218. Cox, 'The Effect of the Search for Equality Upon Judicial Institutions,"

Wash. U.LQ. 795, 798.
219. Fuller, supra n. 214 at 353.
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amicus parties. "[A]micus curiae participation by private groups is
now the norm rather than the exception." 220 The effect of amicus
participation is, of course, speculative, and would require extended
empirical study. But common sense suggests that wealthy, sophisticated, and experienced, organizations would not expend their resources entering Supreme Court litigation unless they believed that
such efforts were profitable-that is, that their presence affects the
outcome.
Furthermore, criticisms which require of a court a "live" dispute in its purest form ignore the development of the declaratory
judgment. The declaratory judgment's effect on the case or controversy requirement is disputed. Whether it is merely a procedural
device which does not substantively change the jurisdiction of the
Court or whether it is a substantive modification is debatable, at the
very least. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n.221 held that a declaratory judgment would violate the constitutional case or controversy doctrine. Nine years later, after the federal Declaratory
Judgment Act was passed, this constitutional bar had suddenly vanished behind the claim that the new Act merely provided a new
remedy. 222 One American scholar attributed this simply to the fact
that, in the interim, "[t]he Court changed its view. '223 The massive
alteration in constitutional litigation in the past few decades has
been largely attributed to the declaratory judgment.224 To characterize the source of such a massive change as remedial rather than substantive surely damages that distinction.
Thus, far from departing from the Supreme Court model, the
inclusion of political interests into the Conseil's practice actually approximates it. The simple presence of numerous cases before the
Supreme Court of multiple parties, especially of distinct political interests, in violation of the traditional model, surely undermines the
claim that the absence of individual litigants before the Conseil
somehow fatally alters its nature.
Procedural
Broadly, the procedural objections amount to the claim that the
Conseil's procedures are unstructured. 22 5 The objections are directed at the lack of any formalized procedures which would con220. O'Connor & Epstein, "Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court
Ltigation," 16 L & Soc. Rev. 311, 318 (1981-2).
221. 277 U.S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 507 (1928).
222. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
223. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 497 (3rd ed. 1976). But see Skelly Oil Co. v.
Philips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
224. Cox, supra n. 218 at 795, 798.
225. See Hamon, supra n. 111 at v. II.
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strain and direct the Conseil's activities, limit and define the kinds
and scope of information it considers, and assure the public or parties a sense of participation. The Conseil's failure to provide an opportunity for hearings, to explain fully its decisions, to issue signed
opinions and dissents, to have unlimited time in which to consider
the issues, and its secrecy and non-oral procedures, are all part of a
criticism basically directed towards the Conseil's unbridled
discretion.
Objections to the secrecy of the Conseil's procedures, however,
seem misplaced when compared to the Supreme Court, which has
been accused of an excessive concern for secrecy. 226 But, even if the
Conseil had formal procedures similar to those of the U.S. Supreme
Court, that would hardly serve to constrain it nor would it necessarily give a meaningful sense of participation--and certainly not one of
control-to parties or the public generally. The Court is largely a
creature of its own discretion. Even the case or controversy doctrine
imposes little real constraint or direction 227. Since the introduction
of the "Brandeis brief", the Court has accepted certain information
through the form of the written brief rather than in the form of a
litigated record. 228 The Court thus considers, in addition to the litigated facts, what are called "social facts". 229 This is essentially no
more than information added to the case, outside the matters which
were tried below, which are consistent with the advocate's-and, ul23
timately, the Court's-perception of a "need for social progress". "
Further, the Court, rather than the record before it, defines the
issues it will decide. By using such techniques as standing, ripeness,
and the political question doctrine, it exercises an extraordinary
amount of discretion and control over the questions that seem to
arise. In fact, it has been praised for exercising those "passive virtues". 231 Furthermore, though theoretically it is only within its certiorarijurisdiction that the Court can exercise complete discretion
over whether to hear a case, it has effectively exercised similar discretion over the cases within its mandatory appellate jurisdiction by
qualifying the precedential effect of summary affirmance of those
cases. 232
The summary affirmance itself is functionally no different than
the Conseil's laconic unexplained decisions. No reasons or explana226. It has maintained a ritualized aura of secrecy which, when breached
even slightly, lends credibility to irresponsible allegations.
Grossman, "Book Review," 1980 Wi. L Rev. 429, 429.
227. See generally, supra, text accompanying n. 108-110.
228. Strum, Louis D. Brandeis-Justicefor the People 114-131 (1984).
229. Id. at 122.
230. Urofsky, A Mind Qf One Piece 39 (1971).
231. Bickel, "Foreword: The Passive Virtues," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961).
232. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1973).

HeinOnline -- 34 Am. J. Comp. L. 83 1986

84

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 34

tions are provided. Because the affirmance is summary, there is no
attribution of position to particular justices nor of divergence among
them, and normally no dissents-since there is no opinion from
which to dissent.
Though theoretically the Court is at least bound by the facts of
each case, it can exercise an astonishing latitude in interpreting the
facts to which they are supposedly bound. Litigants and scholars remark that the cases decided often bear little resemblance to the
cases tried. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,23 the plaintiff was
treated as "an individual who is neither a public official nor a public
figure..." 234 But some commentators have noted the dramatic gap
between the court's view of the facts and the reality that the plain23 5
tiff was a well-known activist, teacher, author, and public speaker.
If the Court has such wide latitude in applying its own gloss to the
facts, then the claim that the Court is bound by the record or, more
importantly, that fair and open procedures allow litigants to control
the direction of litigation, appears to be more of a heuristic statement than a factual description.
Perhaps most importantly, the common law doctrine of stare decisis within which the Court's procedures are supposed to operate
and which, at least to the French, epitomize Supreme Court practice, are subject to wide judicial discretion. Chenot's observation
that there are "no arguments and still less publicity of arguments" 2 36 is only material if there is some firm body of principles
and precedents over which to argue. Perhaps if stare decisis were as
binding as theory claims, the opportunity to engage in a formal process complete with written briefs, public argument, signed opinions,
and dissents, would be meaningful. But, in fact, the Court has insisted that, "[s]ince we deal with a constitutional question, we are
less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other
areas of the law. ' 23 7 As the formal constraints on Supreme Court
practices become more and more dubious, so too does the Conseil's
procedural problem become more illusory than real.
Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional issue is probably equal to the membership issue in its rather obvious misapplication. To pretend that the U.S.
Supreme Court constitutes a "court of last resort" for all other
233. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
234. 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974).
235. Pember & Teeter, "Privacy and the Press since Time, Inc. v. Hill," 50 Wash.
L Rev. 57 (1974); Anderson, "Libel and Press Self-Censorship," 53 Tex L Rev. 422,
448 (1975).
236. See supra n. 112.
237. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1973).
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American jurisdictions is seriously to misstate American constitutional law. Not only do common law techniques allow lower courts
either to avoid Supreme Court precedent altogether or to narrow it
far beyond its intended scope, but the federal system as well as the
multiple and, increasing, number of Federal Courts of Appeal severely restrict the impact of the Supreme Court as the final court.
There are potentially 51 different positions on almost all constitutional questions, as long as none of them fall below minimal federal
standards, which makes the French potential maximum of three
seem almost attractive. Even within one State it is possible, due to
federalism, for different rules to be applied to the same legal issue.
While the New York Court of Appeals decided in People v. McCray,238 that racial discrimination in jury selection was not illegal,
otherwise in a collateral attack
the Second Circuit has since decided
239
facts.
underlying
same
the
on
While the McCray situation may be distinguished from that of
the Conseil and its companion jurisdictions because the Supreme
Court, unlike the Conseil, has the ultimate power to declare a uniform standard, such a distinction is misleading. First, as long as the
Supreme Court exercises its "passive virtues" and fails to act, the result is the same. Secondly, however, to the extent a state court articulates a state constitutional standard more demanding than the
federal one (a reverse McCray situation), the Supreme Court cannot
require the state to adopt the federal rule, potentially leading to a
patchwork of differing240constitutional standards next to which the
French situation pales.
The Court's use of its "passive virtues" 241 as a way of avoiding
decision allows it purposely to tolerate divergence between the Circuits. Its use of summary affirmances has served to perpetuate a
number of unresolved socially volatile issues, such as homosexual
rights. Ironically, because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
McCray, it is possible that other Circuits might take that as an implied endorsement of the case, instead of following the Second Circuit. Or, then again, they might not.
238. 443 N.E.2d 915, 57 N.Y.2d 542 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 77 L.Ed.2d
1322 (1983).
239. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
240. For instance, many states have adopted, on state constitutional grounds, standards involving search and seizure, self-incrimination, double jeopardy, capital punishment, and a host of other issues, which conflict with and are more demanding
than federal constitutional norms. In fact, as the Burger court has become more
conservative, these state decisions have correspondingly increasingly and explicitly
rejected the positions adopted by the Supreme Court. See "State Constitutional

Law," The Natl. LJ.25-32 (Special Section, 12 March 1984); Wilkes, "The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court," 62 Ky.
LJ. 421 (1974).
241. See supra n. 230.
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Certainly, the existence of multiple state jurisdictions, of federal
appeals courts, and even of common law techniques of analysis, does
not alter the essence of the Supreme Court. But to the extent they
transform the nature of the system from a unitary to an interactive
one, the result is not too dissimilar from that of the Conseil, which
has not had many instances of outright conflict with its companion
jurisdictions.
InstitutionalDesign
The U.S. Supreme Court appears to be one of three equal powers whose position, between the other two, is essentially neutral.
The Constitution, including but not limited to Article III, does not
appear textually to favor the President and disfavor Congress. But
that is merely a formal observation. If the French system suffers
from an institutional imbalance, the comparison with the Supreme
Court must inquire into the Court's actual doctrines.
At first, Supreme Court practice as well as theory seems neutral
with respect to the other two branches. To the extent the Court is
solicitous of one branch-for instance through the political question
doctrine-it is equally solicitous of the other branch. The political
question doctrine does not distinguish between questions which are
exclusively vested in the executive or legislative branch. To the extent the Court finds "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," it will
simply refuse to decide the issue. - While the doctrine is neutral on
its face and is probably applied neutrally, some recent decisions in
which the Court did not apply the doctrine but arguably might have
done so actually seem to disfavor the President.2'3
But there seem to be discrete areas, most notably foreign affairs, in which the Court appears predisposed to favor the executive.
This history and fabric of the Supreme Court is fairly defined by
Marbury v. Madison and its progeny, which defines the Court as a
limit on the legislature, not on the executive. Indeed, cases which
involve war powers, espionage, and, more generally, foreign affairs,
exhibit a marked tendency to allow the executive substantial latitude.z4 This kind of selective bias in which the Court favors the ex242. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
243. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 94 S. Ct. 3090
(1974); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 43 L.Ed.2d 1, 95 S. Ct. 839 (1975).
244. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936)

(presidential powers in war-related foreign affairs); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942) (executive and military powers in espionage case during wartime); Yamashita

v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (executive war powers); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934
(1967) (legality of Viet Nam War); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 62 L.Ed.2d 428,
100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (President's unilateral abrogation of treaty); Snepp v. U.S., 444
U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 763 (1980) (executive powers in foreign intelligence matters).
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ecutive only in certain areas may reflect a kind of implicit judgment
analogous to that more explicit judgment in the 1958 French Constitution's distribution of powers between the executive and legislature
in Articles 34 and 37.
Thus, at least with regard to foreign affairs, war powers, espionage, and the like, the Supreme Court exhibits an institutional bias
in favor of the executive much as, if not just as much as, the Conseil
appears potentially biased against the Parlement. But, upon closer
examination, there are instances in which the Conseil has been more
willing to sanction the executive than has our Supreme Court. The
possibility for Conseil hostility towards the executive has only become real since "l'alternance",245 that is, the arrival of the Socialist
government of Francois Mitterand in which both the National Assembly and the Administration are now ideologically opposed to the
more conservative politics which, until now, produced a relatively
conservative Conseil. The most remarkable example was the nationalization decision nullifying the indemnification provisions for Mitterand's plan to nationalize the French banking system. 246 But at
least equally important is a recent decision which effectively limited
the executive and expanded the Article 34 legislative domain by expansively defining the central planning powers of the legislature to
hitherto been thought to be executive powers of
include what had
"planification". 247
The very notion that the institutional position of the Conseil is
ineluctably tied to the administration, opposed to the legislature, is
doubtful. As Bermann observed, the guard of one side of a frontier
effectively is the guard of both. And, others have since observed the
occurrence of this practice in the Conseil's decisions expanding the
legislative domain.248
The legislative domain has been effectively expanded by the recent "price freeze" decision that Article 61 appeals cannot be
brought to challenge alleged legislative intrusion into the administrative domain. 24 9 This, in effect, means that unless the Govern245. Favoreu, "Le Conseil Constitutionnel et L'Alternance," 4 Rev. FranuaiseScience Politique (1984).
246. Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision 132 DC du 16 janvier 1982.
247. Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision 81-142 DC du 27 juillet 1982.
248. Before the appeals of parliamentarians directed against the intrusion of
the legislator upon the regulatory domain, the Conseil has first adopted a
more and more expansive conception of the domain of the law.
Philip, "Le Developpement du Controle de Constitutionnalite," 1983 RD.P. 401, 498.
249. Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision 82-143 DC du 30 juillet 1982.
In this decision of potentially far-reaching implications, the Conseil declared
that Art. 61 could not be used by deputies attacking a law establishing a system of
fines against corporations which violate government price schedules. The deputies
contended that such fines were contraventions which should be a matter of regulation, not of law. The Conseil held that only the Government could raise such a coin-
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ment challenges such legislative action, Parlement is not subject to a
challenge brought by the minority of 60 senators or deputies contemplated by the 1974 amendments to Article 61. Jurisprudentially,
the decision is interesting because it effectively holds that legislative
intrusion into the administrative domain is not seriously unconstitutional, or at least is not at the same level as violations of substantive
constitutional provisions since review of this intrusion is now more
difficult and inaccessible. 25° Most importantly, however, the decision parallels the American political question doctrine by leaving an

executive-legislative dispute alone rather than resolving it.
Finally, the French view that the Conseil was never intended to
be a judicial organ exercising judicial review over legislation is no
different from the view held by some American critics. Those critics
insist that Marbury v. Madison was erroneous and that Supreme
Court judicial review represents a veritable judicial coup d'etat.2 51
Even some French critics view the ramifications of that case
25 2
askance.
CONCLUSION

It follows that the continuing debate over the Conseil's nature
has three main sources: first, factual confusion; secondly, conceptual
confusion; and thirdly, the political evolution and strategies of the
French Republic.
The first source, assuming any reasonable amount of misinformation, does not seem especially problematical, though one cannot
entirely ignore simple mistakes of fact. There is little doubt, as
Favoreu has indicated,2 53 that the French are poorly informed (as
are Americans) in matters of comparative law; misinformation explains much. But the conviction with which the debate over the
Conseil's nature has raged tends to indicate that differences more
fundamental than simple factual mistakes are its source.
The second source is more serious, challenging the very terminology of the debate and the law/politics distinction. The French
use of this distinction as an essentialistic ideal--and the rigide separation of powers doctrine which it inspires-seems bound to produce
insoluble problems because the distinction itself is fundamentally
plaint, holding effectively that delegalization could only be accomplished through
Art. 37, para. 2, or Art. 41, and not through Art. 61. They relied upon the optional
character of the delegalization process, thus refusing to transform a matter of constitutionally-grounded executive discretion into one of constitutional mandate.
250. See Philip supra n. 248 at 498.
251. Berger, Congress v. the Supreme Court (1969); Government by Judiciary

(1977).
252. Lambert, supra n. 14.
253. See Favoreu, Rapport Gndral Introduct(,
Europ6enes at DroitsFondamentaux 26-27 (1982).
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unsound. The debate and the various positions discussed in this article seem to show that. The concept of a court and of legal constraint
as opposed to, and fundamentally distinct from, power in the form of
executive discretion or legislative politics is philosophically and epistemologically suspect.
Both executive discretion and legislative politics are forms of
unconstrained power, that is, power which is bounded only by momentary contingencies. The French essentialistically distinguish
that power and those momentary contingencies from the legal constraints which define and bind judicial action. Therefore, the gulf,
however wide, between a court and a political body-be it executive
or legislative-is always, to the French, certain. That this is almost
surely an illusion can be dramatized through deconstructive
analysis.
Jacques Derrida has written that much philosophical idealization is founded upon an artificial positing, and, more importantly, a
misunderstanding, of illusory first concepts.2 54 According to Derrida, those concepts are mistakenly deemed hierarchically superior
and prior to other, therefore secondary and supposedly opposing,
concepts. Other philosophers, such as Michael Ryan, have advanced
the deconstructive analysis launch by Derrida, going beyond philosophical discourse to demonstrate the arbitrary and illusory nature
of first principles used in political discourse, as well. 255 That ap2 56
proach is useful in law as well as in politics.

254. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (1973); Derrida, Of Grammatology (1976);
Derrida, "Limited Inc. abc," Glyph 2: Johns Hopkins Textual Studies 236 (1977).
255. Ryan, Marcism and Deconstruction(1982).
256. The application of deconstruction of this kind of problem merits an entire
article, but the following paragraph, paraphrased from Ryan, illustrates it, with the
substitution of the words law, constraint, and rules, for the word identity and the
substitution of the words power and discretion for the word difference:
Through the strategy of opposition and prioritization, legal analysis represses everything that troubles its founding values. Indeed, its founding
concepts--constraint, rule certainty, and others-come into being as the effacement and repression of such secondary terms as power and discretion.
Deconstruction consists of upending the legal system of oppositions and priorities by showing how what legal analysis excludes as secondary and derivative in relation to an orginary concept of foundation--constraint say, in
relation to discretion-is in fact more primordial and more general than the
legal original. Discretion is not derived from constraint (nor power from
law); rather, discretion makes constraint possible and, in so doing, makes
impossible a rigorously pure system of constraint in the legal sense, one absolutely exempt from discretion. Once this initial reversal of a legal opposition is accomplished it is possible to prove that all concepts of foundation,
ground, or origin must be similarly displaced. They are in fact points situated in relation to larger systems, chains, and movements, which Derrida
often characterizes by using terms that in metaphysics name secondary and
derivative elements, difference and writing being the most infamous. For
instance, in order to operate, legal constrained power must presuppose discretionary, unconstrained power. Raw power and law relate to each other
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Deconstruction shows that the concept of a judicial body in opposition to a political one, or even of law in opposition to politics, is a
false opposition, prioritizing the former over the latter and making
it seem that they are distinctively different, whereas, in reality, and
as a critical skeptic would understand, the latter are probably more
general than the former. They, in fact, "relate to each other within
257
each other".
It is thus impossible for the critical-skeptic to define the Conseil
as a court or as not a court in opposition to some other political organ just as it is impossible to define a legal domain in opposition to a
political one. Any such attempted distinction quickly unravels as
the debate over the Conseil demonstrates. The reason the French
seem to fail at nailing down the Conseil is due to the fact that they
are trying to nail it to itself; such a slippery object can never be immobilized and trying to do so can only lead to bruises.
All that remains, then, is to understand why this problem has
plagued the French for the past twenty-five years, in contrast to our
relative nonchalance over judicial review. In fact, the number of
American legal critics who think the legitimacy of judicial review is
an important question are no more numerous and influential than
are the relatively few French critics who use the position of avoidance to dismiss the problem of the Conseil as unimportant.
The third source, then, is culturally and historically based.
Clearly, it is the 1958 Constitution that created the problem-but I
do not think it is simply the creation of the Conseil alone which precipitated the debate. It was, instead, the larger change that the Constitution produced which made a debate over law and politics central
to French legal and political discourse. By horizontally diffusing
power that had theretofore been arranged vertically (and thus had
flowed more or less directly to the people), the new Constitution
mandated a debate which would examine the security and responsiveness of democratic ideals. The sudden horizontal bureaucratization of the state, though historically tardy, required the development
of additional legal constraints, or apparent constraints, to replace the
lost vertical, and more direct, if only apparent, control.2 It also rewithin each other, mutually supplementing each other in a way that precludes a rigorous hierarchical and oppositional division between the two.

Derrida claims that this movement of supplemental differentation is more
primordial than any metaphysical opposition or grounding concept of rules,
constraint, or law.

See id. at 10.
257. Id.
258. The observation sometimes made that the partition of competences effected
by Arts. 34 and 37 merely constitutionalized the actual earlier practice of government through decree-laws does not change the claim made here. Decree-laws which
effectively abdicated legislative responsibility in favor of executive discretion had, at
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quired a debate over their legitimacy.
Americans early on adopted judicial review as a way of dramatizing the distinction between law and politics and denying the fact
of its illusory nature. Judicial review thus served as a counterweight to the anti-majoritarian impact of the combination of separation of powers doctrine and so-called democratic mechanisms of
representation. The French, however, were never quite so far from
pure democracy. The principle of legislative supremacy tended to
shield them from the complete isolation that a strong executive
within a fully developed system of separated powers would otherwise bring. A system of laws believed to control that more unresponsive state was necessary to the Americans, but a threat to the
French.
The 1958 Constitution, however, changed all that. DeGaulle's
successful assertion of executive power through that document represented the evolution of French democracy from the unstable, impotent, perhaps too democratic institution of the Third Republic into
a super-bureaucratized industrial democracy. That evolution required the counterweight of some system which would represent a
harbor of safety from the then far more unresponsive and thus
threatening state. It was inevitable, though not necessarily intended, that in response to the development of the 1958 Constitution
an entirely new and apparently constraining system of constitutional
law would develop. The Conseil was simply the one logical source,
but not the only one, 259 of that law. The debate over its nature is

symptomatic of that development and illustrates the centrality of
least, the illusion of ultimate legislative control. The shift from that abdication to
constitutionally legitimate executive powers required, as a correlative, a corresponding apparent control, even if it is, in fact, just as illusory.
259. There seems to have developed, unsurprisingly perhaps, a reciprocal relationship between the Conseil, the Council of State, and perhaps ever the Cour de cassation in which each has influenced the constitutional jurisprudence of the other.
Favoreu, "L'apport du Conseil constitutionnel au droit public," 1980 Pouvoirs 17 n.
13 ff.; 'L'influence de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel sur les differentes
branches du droit," Itineraires a l'onneur de Leo Hamon 235 (1982), sometimes
cited as Melanges Leo Hamon; "L'application direct et l'effet indirect des normes
constitutionnelles," 1984 Rev. frandisedr. admin. 174 n. 0. Compare Conseil constititionnel, Decision No. 71-44 D.C. of 16 July 1971, with Societe Eky, Conseil d'Etat 12
February 1960, J.C.P. 1960, II, 10629 bis note Vedel; see Odent, Contentieux administrative 1970-1971, at 166; Favoreu & Philip, Les grandes decisions du conseil constitutionnel 245 (2d ed. 1979). Compare Conseil constitutionnel,Decision of 11 June 1981,
with Jamart, Conseil d'Etat, 7 February 1936, S. 1937.3.113. See Luchaire &
Luchaire, Le droit de la decentralisation94 (1983). Compare Conseil constitutionnel, Decision No. 74-54 D.C. of 15 January 1975, with Societe Jacques Vabre, C. Cass.
Ch. mixte, 24 May 1975, 1975 RD.P. 1335. Compare Conseil constitutionnel,Decision
No. 77-87 D.C. of 23 November 1977, with DameR c/RAsociation pour l'education
populaire Ste. Marthe, Cass. Ass. plen., 19 May 1978, D. 1978, 541, consl. Schemelk,
note Ardant.
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the law/politics distinction which is at the heart of all fully developed liberal democracies.
It was in the environment of this growing but inevitable body of
overarching rules that the Conseil was born. Inevitably it would
fashion the rules--or, at least, a part of them-that the bureaucratized state required. In those circumstances, the articulation of constitutional rules was a necessary correlative of the horizontal
dispersion of power-necessary to convince the French that, in place
of the more immediate vertical legislative responsiveness, there was
at least some constraint, any constraint. In this context, I do not
personally think that it mattered that the Conseil was, theoretically,
only a limit upon the legislature. The creation, or massive expansion, of a body of constitutional law was far more important than its
particular content. It is interesting, nonetheless, to note the growing
real limits the Conseil has managed to impose upon the executive
2
despite the Conseil's theoretical design. 60
The Conseil's function looks, therefore, very much like what an
American thinks of as a court, despite differences in detail.
Whether it is called a court may not matter. But the function it performs was essential, and remains essential, to maintain the illusion
that the state is responsive to its citizens, once real democratic responsiveness, or at least its appearance, is lost to state bureaucracy.

260. See supra, text accompanying n. 245-247.
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